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ABOLISHING PRIVATE PRISONS:  
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL IMPERATIVE 
Robert Craig* and andré douglas pond cummings+ 
I. INTRODUCTION
President Richard Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” in 1971.1
President Ronald Reagan federalized and militarized this “war” in the 
* Associate Director, Abolish Private Prisons.  J.D., University of Pennsylvania School
of Law.  I want to thank Professor dré cummings for his expertise and kindness
writing this article with me.  Additionally, everybody at Abolish Private Prisons,
including the Board of Directors and Executive Director John Dacey, has contributed
crucial insight—of course, none of this work would be possible without the generous
donors who support the organization.  My partner Erin Duncan-O’Neill and son
Connor helped weather this unique time together and made it possible to find
enjoyment in our near-isolation.  The University of Baltimore Law Review shepherded
this work with care, and any remaining issues are the authors’ fault.
+ Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of
Law; J.D., Howard University School of Law.  I am grateful to my co-author Robert
Craig for partnering expertly with me on this article and for his excellent work as
Associate Director of Abolish Private Prisons, an Arizona 501(c)(3) created to combat
private for-profit incarceration.  I am appreciative to John Dacey the Executive
Director of Abolish Private Prisons for his tireless work in exposing and challenging
the private prison regime.  I am grateful to the University of Arkansas at Little Rock
William H. Bowen School of Law summer research grant which supported this work.
I wish to express appreciation and respect to the terrific Univeristy of Baltimore Law
Review editorial staff who organized a superb symposium “400 Years: Slavery and
the Criminal Justice System” and who contributed thoughtful comments and helpful
suggested edits to this resulting article.  Finally, I express profound appreciation to
my partner Lavinia and our babies, Cole Kaianuanu, Malia Ao’ilagi, and Maxwell
Keave, who bring light and joy to my life, whose daily work is spent seeking to reveal
and reverse racial and corporate injustice that often exists in the dark.  As usual, any
errors within are the sole responsibility of the authors.
1. See Ed Vulliamy, Nixon’s ‘War on Drugs’ Began 40 Years Ago, and the Battle Is Still
Raging, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2011, 7:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/
2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years [https://perma.cc/S4QN-6TBW] (“Four decades
ago, on 17 July 1971, President Richard Nixon declared what has come to be called
the ‘war on drugs.’ Nixon told Congress that drug addiction had ‘assumed the
dimensions of a national emergency,’ and asked Capitol Hill for an initial $84m
(£52m) for ‘emergency measures.’ Drug abuse, said the President, was ‘public enemy
number one.’”).
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1980s.2  Shortly after the War on Drugs was declared, federalized, 
and militarized, a private for-profit company in Tennessee sprang up 
calling itself the Corrections Corporations of America (CCA).3  The 
creation of this private prison corporation ushered in a new carceral 
era where the traditional government function of adjudicating crime, 
punishment, and imprisonment became intertwined with the 
corporate governance principles and goals of profit maximization for 
shareholders; executive compensation based on profits and share 
price; forward-looking statements forecasting more robust prison 
populations; and increased profit levels built almost solely on human 
misery and degradation.4  
In 1985, Professor Ira Robbins testified to the House Subcommittee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice that U.S. 
jurisdictions considering contracting with private entities for 
incarceration services should proceed cautiously because there may 
be serious constitutional and pragmatic concerns with such an 
arrangement.5  He penned a law review article further delineating 
reasons to approach private incarceration with caution6 and served as 
the reporter for the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Task Force 
on Privatization of Corrections.7  That Resolution was adopted at the 
February 1990 Midyear Meeting as 115B and “urg[ed] that 
jurisdictions considering authorization of contracts with private 
corporations or other private entities . . . do so with extreme caution . 
2. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 48–49, 69, 73 (2010).
3. See andré douglas pond cummings, “All Eyez on Me”: America’s War on Drugs and
the Prison-Industrial Complex, 15 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 417, 419 (2012);
see generally Tom Beasley, A New Industry Emerges to Meet a Very Real Need,
CORECIVIC, http://www.corecivic.com/about/history [https://perma.cc/T2BS-JEKQ]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2020) (CCA recently changed its name to CoreCivic; this article
will, hereinafter, use the current name even when referring to the company’s actions
taken under the prior name).
4. See cummings, supra note 3, at 419–20; see generally SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN
PRISON: A REPORTER’S UNDERCOVER JOURNEY INTO THE BUSINESS OF PUNISHMENT 45, 
206, 229 (2018) (describing the human misery and general debasement of prisoners at
private prison facilities run by CoreCivic in Oklahoma and Louisiana).
5. Privatization of Corrections: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
& the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 69–107 (1985–
1986) (statement of Ira P. Robbins, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law).
6. See Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69 JUDICATURE
324, 325, 331 (1987).
7. Ira P. Robbins Biography, AM. U. WASH. C. L., https://www.wcl.american.edu/comm
unity/faculty/profile/robbins/bio [https://perma.cc/7HET-WNYT] (last visited Apr. 1,
2020).
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. . .”8  The Resolution further recognized that “the imposition and 
implementation of a sentence of incarceration for a criminal offense 
is a core function of government . . . and there is a strong public 
interest in having prison and jail systems in which lines of 
accountability are clear.”9   
Despite passage of Resolution 115B in 1990, government reliance 
on private incarceration has since increased approximately sixteen-
fold.10  Private prison corporation directors, executives, managers, 
and their hired lobbyists currently work doggedly to increase 
shareholder profits by: (1) influencing carceral policy so that larger 
numbers of U.S. residents face incarceration;11 (2) exploiting 
individuals locked up through private prison labor contracts;12 (3) 
lobbying elected government officials to privatize entire state and 
federal prison systems and increase prison populations;13 (4) 
diminishing the quality of food and degree of safety for prisoners in 
order to cut costs at privately run facilities;14 (5) drafting legislation 
and lobbying elected legislators for passage of draconian sentencing 
guidelines including three-strikes and you’re out, mandatory 
minimums, and illegal immigration detention legislation;15 (6) 
bribing judges to fill private prison facilities with children on 




10. DAVID SHAPIRO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 5 (Nov. 2, 2011) (citing to a United States
Department of Justice report), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document
/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DXZ-NHUA].
11. See cummings, supra note 3, at 439–40.
12. See Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality
of Working Inmates, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 679, 682 (2015); see Patrice A.
Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison Industrial
Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 592, 600, 611 (2012) (discussing the exploitation
of prisoners within the prison industrial complex).
13. Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Corporation Offers Cash in Exchange for State
Prisons, HUFFPOST (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:37 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
02/14/private-prisons-buying-state-prisons_n_1272143.html [https://perma.cc/68SA-
KEKG].  CoreCivic offered to purchase state-owned prison facilities from forty-eight
cash-strapped states, so long as the state contractually agreed to keep the prisons
occupied at 90% capacity.  Id.
14. GREGORY GEISLER, CORRECTION INSTITUTION INSPECTION COMMITTEE, LAKE ERIE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 3–5, 13, 39 (2013); see also BAUER, supra note 4, at 39–
40, 91, 142–44 (detailing the unsafe and foolhardy cost cutting measures CoreCivic
engaged in at a private prison in Louisiana).
15. See cummings, supra note 3, at 438–39.
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questionable charges;16 (7) requiring governments and municipalities 
that contract for their services to maintain capacity in their private 
prison facilities at 90% or in some contracts 100%;17 and (8) building 
new prisons despite no government contract or inmates to fill them.18 
Despite Professor Robbins’s and the ABA’s warning to proceed 
into prison privatization with extreme caution, what seems 
undeniable now is that the warning went unheeded and today private 
prison corporations are driven by perverse and immoral incentives 
whereby an increase in crime and an increase in the number of 
human beings placed into America’s brutal prisons is good business 
news for that industry.19  In reflecting on the fact that United States 
prison conditions are cruel and dehumanizing,20 and that so many 
prisoners are low-level, nonviolent minor drug offenders,21 the 
question as to why we as a nation stand for private corporate profit in 
the realm of human imprisonment must be addressed and resolved.22 
The perverse incentives that drive corporate profit are revealed when 
a growing population of imprisoned U.S. residents energizes 
corporate interests.23  A private prison analyst recently stated that the 
consistent yearly increase in the prison population “from a business 
model perspective[] [is] clearly good news.”24 
16. Ian Urbina, Despite Red Flags About Judges, a Kickback Scheme Flourished, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/us/28judges.html
[https://perma.cc/UL3K-A6KK].
17. Kevin Johnson, Private Purchasing of Prisons Locks in Occupancy Rates, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 8, 2012, 12:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-
03-01/buying-prisons-require-high-occupancy/53402894/1 [https://perma.cc/2W54-
Y4U5]; Chris Kirkham, Prison Quotas Push Lawmakers to Fill Beds, Derail Reform,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/private-prison-
quotas_n_3953483 [https://perma.cc/LV4S-66D2].
18. Matthew Mulch, Crime and Punishment in Private Prisons, 66 NAT’L LAW. GUILD 
REV. 70, 74–75 (2009) (remarking that private prison companies, like CoreCivic, are
“building prisons on spec, with no contract to build and no prisoners to house”).
19. See infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
20. See generally BAUER, supra note 4, at 45, 66, 206, 227 (describing the brutal and
dehumanizing conditions present in the CoreCivic-run private prison in Louisiana and
detailing the history of brutality that private profit incarceration has foisted upon
inmates, often imprisoned for dubious reasons).
21. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 95–97, 99, 186–87 (explaining the
number of arrests and convictions that result from the War on Drugs are
discriminatory and incarcerate hundreds of thousands of low-level drug offenders).
22. See cummings, supra note 3, at 433–34.
23. andré douglas pond cummings & Adam Lamparello, Private Prisons and the New
Marketplace for Crime, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 407, 413 (2016); see
cummings, supra note 3, at 421–22.
24. JeeYeon Park, Lock Up Profits — in Prison Stocks: Analyst, CNBC (Nov. 1, 2010,
11:48 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/39949086 [https://perma.cc/3SUC-G6BB].
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Private prison executives and lobbyists seek to increase 
privatization of the industry by promising that their prisons are run 
more efficiently at lower costs, with greater safety records, improved 
facilities, and with greater outcomes for prisoners.25  However, 
studies and reports now show that these declarations by private 
prison executives and lobbyists are deceitful.26  Private prisons are 
increasingly being shown to cost contracting governments’ more, not 
less, are less safe, and less economical.27  The exchange of taxpayer 
funds from governments and municipalities into the hands of 
corporate shareholders and executives is nothing more than an 
unabashed transfer of taxpayer monies into the personal accounts of 
those with a stake in private prisons—which are being shown to 
provide no real benefit in return.28  Private incarceration makes no 
sense morally,29 and it is increasingly apparent that the industry 
makes no sense economically30 and, in fact, is likely 
unconstitutional.31 
In 2005, Professor Robbins again addressed the issue of prison 
privatization.32  His conclusions have been updated, including that 
private prisons are a “lamentable experiment” and “that the concept . 
. . is bad policy . . . based on a tenuous legal foundation . . . [with] 
profound moral implications.”33  Robbins notes the many “routine, 
quasi-judicial decisions” private vendors make that affect prisoners’ 
welfare and legal status; the daily operations of private prisons that 
are conducted outside of public supervision; and the financial bias 
injected into circumstances where private corporations and key 
25. cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 413; see also CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & 
CAROLINE GLESSMAN, PRISON BED PROFITEERS: HOW CORPORATIONS ARE RESHAPING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE U.S. 2 (May 2012), http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/
 publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TCM-T5M3].
26. cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 413; see also dré cummings, Private
Prison Industry Shenanigans in Florida, CORP. JUST. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2012, 9:30 AM),
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/private-prison-industry-
shenanigans-in.html [https://perma.cc/WZN7-VGD4].
27. cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 413.
28. Id. at 413–14; see also David M. Reutter, Florida Provides Lesson in How Not to
Privatize State Prisons, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/feb/15/florida-provides-lesson-in-how-
not-to-privatize-state-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/UJ6W-62BV].
29. cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 414.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: A Violation of U.S. Domestic Law,
International Human Rights, and Good Sense, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12, 12 (2006).
33. Id. at 12, 16.
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employees make more money when more people are imprisoned for 
longer periods are each lamentable outcomes of a failed 
experiment.34  Over the past few decades the United States has seen: 
the rapid, profitable growth and political influence of the private 
prison industry;35 how incarceration-for-profit ensures more 
incarceration, quashes alternatives to incarceration, and creates a 
financial bias in jailers against the release of prisoners;36 and, how 
mainstream religions have criticized private, for-profit prisons as 
immoral.37  There is increasing reason for concern that these private 
prison corporations will become even more involved at the front end 
of law enforcement by working with police agencies to make sure 
their facilities stay filled.38 
This article will show: first, that mixing profit with the core 
governmental function of incarceration leads to damaging 
consequences for prisoners, employees (of both private and public 
prisons), and the public at large while benefiting a small group of 
executives and shareholders;39 second, that the implementation of 
for-profit incarceration in the United States hampers access to justice, 
particularly for already marginalized groups;40 and third, that the 
serious constitutional concerns noted by Professor Robbins have been 
borne out, and they now deserve consideration by the United States 
Supreme Court.41     
34. See id. at 12.
35. See, e.g., CAROLINE ISAACS, PRIVATE PRISONS: THE PUBLIC’S PROBLEM, at i–ii (Feb.
2012), https://www.afsc.org/sites/default/files/documents/Arizona_Prison_Report_Ex
ecutive_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD6R-ESA6] (tracing the path between
donations from private prison lobbyists in Arizona to the passage of a bill authorizing
privatization of almost the entire state correctional system).
36. See SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 12.
37. See generally Join the Movement!, ABOLISH PRIV. PRISONS, https://www.abolishprivat
eprisons.org/resolutions [https://perma.cc/CT87-H6HH] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020)
(providing an up-to-date list of religious organizations criticizing the industry).
38. See Beau Hodai, Private Prison Company Used in Drug Raids at Public High School,
COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2012/11/2
7/private-prison-company-used-drug-raids-public-high-school [https://perma.cc/92YM
-2ADP]; see also P. Smith, In Profit-Sharing Scheme, Oklahoma DA Used Contractor
for Highway Drug Stops, STOP DRUG WAR (July 22, 2013, 6:05 PM),
https://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2013/jul/22/profitsharing_scheme_oklahoma_da
[https://perma.cc/ASL3-H6TN] (“[T]he contract . . . gave Desert Snow 25% of all
assets seized during training days and 10% of all assets seized even on days the
contractors were not present.”).
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Part III.
41. See infra Part IV.
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II. INHERENT CONSEQUENCES OF LINKING PROFIT AND
INCARCERATION
Privatization of incarceration introduces serious perverse incentives 
created by government and financial bias throughout the criminal 
justice process,42 and contracting a core government function to 
private entities undermines the legitimacy of the justice system at 
large.43  “Perhaps the most perverse incentive in the private prison 
industry is that shareholder and executive profit are intimately tied to 
the number of prisoners that enter the private prison facility.”44 
When a profit motive is attached to human misery and bondage such 
as incarceration, the evidence shows that the depths to which profit 
seekers will sink to earn revenues knows no bounds, and the effects 
reverberate through the justice system.45  
Private prison companies, while forcefully disclaiming such 
action,46 aggressively lobby for harsher prison sentences such as 
mandatory-minimums and three-strikes laws;47 for legislation that 
creates new crimes requiring incarceration, such as criminalization of 
illegal immigration or active detention of schoolchildren;48 and 
42. See infra notes 46–66 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 46–71 and accompanying text.
44. cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 429; see also cummings, supra note 3, at
436–38.
45. See BAUER, supra note 4, at 39, 49–50 (highlighting one way in which private prisons
choose to cut costs in order to ensure the maximization of profits).
46. See Richard P. Seiter, Private Corrections: A Review of the Issues, CORRECTIONS
CORP. AM. (Mar. 2008), https://ccamericastorage.blob.core.windows.net/media/Defau
lt/documents/CCA-Resource-Center/Private_Corr_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NS
R-524W].  According to CoreCivic, it is a myth that they promote longer and tougher
sentences.  Corr. Corp. of Am., Myths v. Reality in Private Corrections: The Truth
Behind the Criticism, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
publications/cca_myth_vs._reality_in_corrections_promotional_sheet.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/V5TH-6P67] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).  But see Lee Fang, Disclosure Shows
Private Prison Company Misled on Immigration Lobbying, NATION (June 4, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/disclosure-shows-private-prison-company-misled-
immigration-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/9BPE-MTYQ] (“A new disclosure shows
that . . . Geo Group, has in fact paid an ‘elite team of federal lobbyists’ to influence
the comprehensive immigration reform legislation making its way through
Congress.”).
47. cummings, supra note 3, at 438–39, 438 n.102.
48. See, e.g., Nicole Flatow, Mississippi County Jails Kids for School Dress Code
Violations, Tardiness, DOJ Alleges, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 27, 2012, 2:00 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/mississippi-county-jails-kids-for-school-dress-code-violation
s-tardiness-doj-alleges-1fa9a26ae83b/ [https://perma.cc/4GXN-JLXQ] (describing
how the police are a “taxi-service” for shuttling students to jail for class misbehavior).
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against decriminalization.49  In fact, these actions have been 
generously rewarded as of late; reports reveal that the two largest 
private prison companies, CoreCivic and GEO Group, together 
generated more than $2.9 billion in revenue in 2010, with revenues 
ever increasing through 2019.50  To increase revenue at the rate 
indicated, private prison corporations, as mentioned above, hire 
lobbyists to increase prison populations and prison construction.51 
We argue that lobbying to increase the stream of prisoners and 
lobbying for harsher sentencing regimes is not just unseemly but 
inhumane,52 which leads to another aberrant incentive of prison 
privatization: to increase profit, a private prison CEO is not selling 
more shoes (like Nike) or making additional motion pictures (like 
Disney), but is instead seeking to increase the flow of clients—
prisoners—into the prison system.53  Or stated another way, the 
49. See, e.g., Michael Cohen, How For-Profit Prisons Have Become the Biggest Lobby
No One Is Talking About, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/28/how-for-profit-
prisons-have-become-the-biggest-lobby-no-one-is-talking-about/ [https://perma.cc/D5
5R-Q85G] (“The two largest for-profit prison companies in the United States . . . have
funneled more than $10 million to candidates since 1989 and have spent nearly $25
million on lobbying efforts.”).  In a recent telling example, private prison companies
donated heavily to Donald Trump’s campaign, and their stocks sharply increased after
he was elected President.  Under Mr. Trump, Private Prisons Thrive Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/opinion/under-mr-
trump-private-prisons-thrive-again.html [https://perma.cc/V3K7-KVMU].
50. cummings, supra note 3, at 436–37; see also Andrea Nill Sanchez, Private Prisons
Spend Millions on Lobbying to Put More People in Jail, THINKPROGRESS (June 23,
2011, 4:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/private-prisons-spend-millions-on-
lobbying-to-put-more-people-in-jail-58e048bb37dd/ [https://perma.cc/4AE5-HQWF].
These profits have continued to grow in the past decade, as GEO Group alone
reported bringing in $2.47 billion in revenue for 2019.  See Renae Merle & Tracy Jan,
Wall Street Pulled Its Financing. Stocks Have Plummeted. But Private Prisons Still
Thrive., WASH. POST (Oct. 3. 2019, 12:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2019/10/03/wall-street-pulled-its-financing-stocks-have-plummeted-private-
prisons-still-thrive/ [https://perma.cc/9D9L-2TWJ].
51. Lee Fang, Prison Industry Funnels Donations to State Lawmakers Introducing
SB1070-Like Bills Around the Country, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 16, 2010),
https://thinkprogress.org/prison-industry-funnels-donations-to-state-lawmakers-introd
ucing-sb1070-like-bills-around-the-afd16ced43b6/ [https://perma.cc/4AE5-HQWF].
52. See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.
53. cummings, supra note 3, at 437; see also PAUL ASHTON & AMANDA PETTERUTI,
JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 22,
(June 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming
_the_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2G9-PD4U] (explaining that private prison
companies have hired thirty lobbyists in Florida to promote their prison interests).
Furthermore, CoreCivic has given over $900,000 annually to federal candidates since
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private prison corporation is seeking to profit off of increasing the 
number of U.S. bodies that can be locked in cages.54 
The amount of private prison company dollars spent on lobbying 
efforts is substantial.55  CoreCivic spent more than $3 million on 
federal lobbying in 2005 and more than $1.2 million in 2019.56  The 
largest U.S. private prison companies together have spent dozens of 
millions of dollars lobbying both state and federal elected officials 
since the founding of the U.S. private prison corporation in the 
1970s.57  Private prison lobbyists advocate for harsh legislative 
initiatives that increase the number of individuals sentenced to prison 
time58 because “private prisons make money from putting people 
behind bars.”59  In addition, prison lobbyists battle to grow 
appropriations in expenditures in law enforcement, pass severe 
immigration laws, and increase immigration detention.60  They also 
seek to influence lawmakers to implement unforgiving incarceration 
policies like the 2010 Arizona immigration legislation, originally 
titled “The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
2003, and the prison companies have given more than $16 million to state and federal 
legislators since 2000, providing additional evidence that states are some of the 
private prison companies’ most important clients.  Id. at 22, 24.  
54. See Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america
[https://perma.cc/F44Q-AGXU].
55. See ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 53, at 17 (showing that in state campaign
contributions from 2003 to 2010, CoreCivic has spent over $1.5 million in twenty-
seven states, GEO has spent $2.4 million in twenty-three states, and from 2006 to
2009, Cornell Companies has spent $72,000 in six states).
56. Id. at 24; see also Client Profile: CoreCivic Inc., OPENSECRETS, http://www.
opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2019&id=D000021940
[https://perma.cc/VX78-UVT7] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) (reporting that CoreCivic
spent $1.23 million on lobbying in 2019).
57. See ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 53, at 22–24.
58. See id.  The private prison companies promote and advocate for “three-strikes” and
“truth-in-sentencing” legislation because this creates more business.  Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 21.
60. See Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Helped Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 28, 2010, 11:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/
prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law [https://perma.cc/VJU7-PV5L];
see also Geiza Vargas-Vargas, The Investment Opportunity in Mass Incarceration: A
Black (Corrections) or Brown (Immigration) Play?, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 357–58
(2012) (“Prison companies cannot justify building new prisons on the basis of drug
convictions.  However, prison companies can justify the building of new prisons
based on a whole new kind of prisoner: the illegal alien, and more specifically, the
‘Mexican.’”).
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Act” (SB 1070).61  Several reports show that private prison lobbyists 
had a hand in drafting the legislation that became SB 1070.62 
Corporations are free to make campaign contributions to elected 
government officials, and the private prison lobby contributes 
liberally.63  In light of the seminal 2010 Supreme Court case Citizens 
United,64 private prison corporations’ campaign contributions can 
now be made directly from the private prison corporate treasury to 
the federal and state legislators and judges whom they hope to 
influence.65  Research indicates that private prison companies 
contribute millions of dollars to mostly incumbent politicians, 
seeking to garner influence in the legislative process, to continue 
privatizing the prison regime and receive advantageous contracts for 
private prison construction.66  
According to news reports, more problems appear in the 
courthouse.67  In what would eventually come to be known as the 
“Kids For Cash” scandal, two Pennsylvania judges sentenced 
juveniles to detention at twice the state average, earning $2.6 million 
in kickbacks.68  In Iowa, the husband of a federal judge had 
significant stock holdings of two private prisons; he increased those 
holdings just five days before an immigration raid where nearly 400 
workers were arrested, and of those, about 270 were sentenced to five 
months in federal prisons.69  And in Mississippi, a former 
61. cummings, supra note 3, at 438–39; see ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 53, at 30;
see How Corporate Interests Got SB 1070 Passed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2010,
1:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2010/11/09/131191523/how-corporate-interests-got-
sb-1070-passed [https://perma.cc/G6UR-BGF6]; see also Fang, supra note 51.
62. See Sullivan, supra note 60; see also How Corporate Interests Got SB 1070 Passed,
supra note 61.
63. ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 53, at 15–22.
64. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319, 362–67 (2010).
65. See andré douglas pond cummings, Procuring ‘Justice’?: Citizens United, Caperton,
and Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 98 (2010) [hereinafter
cummings, Procuring ‘Justice’?]; see also Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered
Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 745–49 (2011) (describing the potential
nefarious consequences of Citizens United).
66. cummings, supra note 3, at 437–39; see ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 53, at 15–
22; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 39.
67. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
68. ‘Kids for Cash’ Captures a Juvenile Justice Scandal from Two Sides, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Mar. 8, 2014, 6:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/08/287286626/kids-for-
cash-captures-a-juvenile-justice-scandal-from-two-sides [https://perma.cc/NJ7A-
KNVV]; Urbina, supra note 16.
69. Samantha Michaels, A Federal Judge Put Hundreds of Immigrants Behind Bars While
Her Husband Invested in Private Prisons, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/08/a-federal-judge-put-hundreds-
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commissioner of the Department of Corrections accepted over $1 
million in bribes in exchange for lucrative state contracts with private 
prisons.70  Not one of these problems would have occurred had the 
traditional government function of imprisonment been left in public 
hands, rather than private—each serves to highlight the corrupting 
influence that profit has on human actors.71  
Because a for-profit prison’s primary motivation is to maximize 
profit, lowering the operational costs of running a facility is often at 
the forefront of their decision-making process.72  This goal often 
results in fewer available educational opportunities for prisoners, and 
because private prison corporations benefit from high recidivism, 
they have every incentive not to use proven anti-recidivism 
programs.73  As one commentator notes, “[m]uch of the presumed 
cost savings of private prisons are achieved through lower staffing 
costs: private prisons pay their employees less than public prisons.”74 
Likewise, private incarceration facilities understaff relative to public 
of-immigrants-behind-bars-while-her-husband-invested-in-private-prisons/ 
[https://perma.cc/5UPV-NX3K]. 
70. Alana Blinder, 2 Former Mississippi Officials Plead Guilty in a Graft Case Involving
Private Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
02/26/us/christopher-epps-former-mississipi-prisons-chief-pleads-guilty-in-corruption
-case.html [https://perma.cc/BG8G-PECA].  The investigation into the former
commissioner uncovered an even broader scheme: former legislator Cecil McCrory;
former state senator Irb Benjamin of Madison; Teresa Malone, the wife of former
lawmaker and former House Corrections Chairman Bennett Malone; Texas
businessman Mark Longoria; Dr. Carl Reddix; business and government consultant
Robert Simmons; former MDOC insurance broker Guy E. Evans; and prison
consultant Sam Waggoner were all charged and pled guilty.  Jimmie E. Gates, 4
Louisiana Businessmen Charged in Chris Epps’ Corruption Case, CLARION LEDGER
(Oct. 4, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/10/04/chris-
epps-corruption-case-4-la-businessmen-charged-bribery/1524892002/
[https://perma.cc/VYY3-ZD3Q].
71. See infra Section III.A.
72. In fact, this downward pressure on operational cost is perhaps the marquee feature of
private incarceration and how the concept is sold to legislatures and other public
decision-makers.  See generally BAUER, supra note 4, at 40, 142–43, 204–05, 253
(showing that as an undercover prison guard, decisions from hiring, through training,
to guarding prisoners, are all subject to this downward pressure leading to unwise and
unsafe outcomes).
73. See, e.g., Judith Greene, Comparing Private and Public Prison Services and
Programs in Minnesota: Findings from Prisoner Interviews, 11 CURRENT ISSUES 
CRIM. JUST. 202, 215–16 (1999) (finding that prisoners were significantly less likely
to have access to any kind of education during private incarceration).
74. Matt Simmons, Punishment & Profits: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Private Prisons,
OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 7, 2013), https://okpolicy.org/punishment-profits-a-cost-
benefit-analysis-of-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/3LVH-8KD3].
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ones,75 and even the staff eventually hired by private prison 
corporations tend to be underqualified and suffer from higher 
turnover.76  These decisions sometimes lead to disastrous results.77   
In one 2016 case, a federal judge said conditions at one private 
prison “paint[ed] a picture of such horror as should be unrealized 
anywhere in the civilized world,” as the prison was essentially run by 
gangs, held organized gladiator-style fights encouraged by guards, 
and had “sexual misconduct . . . among the worst that we have seen 
in any facility anywhere in the nation.”78  In another stunning case, 
“[a] private prison in Idaho . . . established a reputation as 
a ‘gladiator school’ because prison guards encouraged violence 
between inmates.”79  Oklahoma Director of Department of 
Corrections Joe Allbaugh stated that he does not “believe taxpayers 
should be paying a premium for our prisoners [to private 
corporations]. . . . [B]ecause I think we can house inmates more 
efficiently.”80  At bottom, cost-effectiveness alone means nothing 
without accounting for the quality of the prison environment, which 
evidence shows borders on abusive.81 
The profit motive also leads to less safety for correctional officers 
as operators drive down expenditures when reducing staffing costs.82 
Private prisons pay individual officers less: on average private 
corrections officers “received salaries that were about $7,000 lower 
than the average public officer’s salary.”83  And in addition to paying 
each private officer less than their public counterparts, private prison 
operators “also tend to hire fewer officers; private prisons report an 
average of one officer per 6.9 inmates compared to one officer per 
75. See David M. Siegel, Internalizing Private Prison Externalities: Let’s Start with the
GED, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 101, 106–07 (2016).
76. David N. Khey, Privatization of Prison, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 1036, 1041 (Wesley G. Jennings ed., 1st ed. 2016).
77. See, e.g., BAUER, supra note 4, at 143–44.
78. Timothy Williams, Privately Run Mississippi Prison, Called a Scene of Horror, Is
Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/us/
mississippi-closes-private-prison-walnut-grove.html [https://perma.cc/3DLD-AHJV].
79. Simmons, supra note 74.
80. Andrew Knittle, Oklahoma Paid Record $92.7 Million to Private Prisons in 2015,
OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/5487769/okla
homa-paid-record-927-million-to-private-prisons-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/Y7T7-
MPT4].
81. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—the Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838,
1883 (2002).
82. See Megan Mumford et al., The Economics of Private Prisons, HAMILTON PROJECT
(Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/the_economics_of_private_
prisons [https://perma.cc/KE4V-3RHA].
83. Id.
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4.9 inmates in public facilities.”84  In Oklahoma, “the ugliest 
outbreaks of prison violence toward correctional officers and among 
inmates have occurred in [that state’s] private prisons, underlining 
the dangerous conditions in those facilities.”85   
In addition, the legitimacy of the justice system at large suffers 
from both normative and descriptive problems of private 
incarceration.86  As discussed above, private prisons have been 
plagued by scandals, some of which have gripped the nation’s 
attention.87  Because the systemic problems of private incarceration 
stretch from legislation through release, the public has witnessed the 
negative effects on legislators, judges, and the prison institutions 
themselves.88  These problems have contributed to a declining view 
of the justice system among U.S. residents,89 including debates over 
the morality of investing in the private prison industry.90  Scholarly 
research also largely views the normative case for private 
incarceration with great skepticism.91  
III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The discussion about whether for-profit prison corporations can
deliver on their stated purpose masks a more important failing: they 
are crucial components in perpetuating the failed policies that lead to 
84. Id.; see also BAUER, supra note 4, at 142–43.
85. Ryan Gentzler, Private Prisons Are Bad Policy, but They’re Not to Blame for
Oklahoma’s Incarceration Problem, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://okpolicy.org/private-prisons-are-bad-policy-but-theyre-not-to-blame-for-
oklahomas-incarceration-problem/ [https://perma.cc/7AQH-V8ED].
86. See infra notes 105–10 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 67–80 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 46–84 and accompanying text.
89. Congressional job approval remains among the lowest in the past quarter-century.
Congress and the Public, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/Congress-
Public.aspx [https://perma.cc/3XL7-W9XD] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).  Public
opinion on the justice system at large has decreased since the early 2000s.
Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/Confidence-
Institutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZY5-CSZH] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
90. Mike Antonucci, California’s Pension Fund Managers Are at Odds with Activists and
Some Union Leaders over Divestments, LA SCH. REP. (Feb. 27, 2018),
http://laschoolreport.com/californias-pension-fund-managers-are-at-odds-with-
activists-and-some-union-leaders-over-divestments/ [https://perma.cc/F82R-XBDY].
91. See, e.g., Yoav Peled & Doron Navot, Private Incarceration – Towards a
Philosophical Critique, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 216, 216–17, 30 (2012) (developing a
moral argument against private incarceration based on civic republican foundations).
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mass incarceration and hamper access to justice.92  Public prisons 
have their share of problems, of course: overcrowding, safety, and 
crumbling infrastructure among them.93  But injecting the core state 
function of incarceration with a profit motive leads to its own 
problems, many of which particularly affect already disadvantaged 
and oppressed communities.94  In fact, private, for-profit 
incarceration violates all three principles of the United States 
Department of Justice’s Office for Access to Justice: ensuring 
fairness, increasing efficiency, and promoting accessibility.95 
A. Ensuring Fairness
One of the core principles of “access to justice” initiatives is
ensuring that the judicial system delivers “fair and just outcomes for 
all parties, including those facing financial and other 
disadvantages.”96  Placing a financial motive into the justice system 
works directly against that purpose.97 
First, private prison operators have a strong financial incentive to 
keep prison occupancy as high as possible because, as a business, 
large and predictable revenue streams are crucial for corporate health 
and vitality.98  This incentive manifests in lobbying against common 
sense criminal justice reforms and lobbying for expansion of criminal 
and immigration laws.99  For example, as introduced above, a report 
92. See Julia Bowling, Do Private Prison Contracts Fuel Mass Incarceration? BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/do-private-prison-contracts-fuel-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/S5VV-
2DCU].
93. See P.R. Lockhart, America Is Finally Being Exposed to the Devastating Reality of
Prison Violence, VOX (Apr. 5, 2019, 7:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/4/5/18297326/prison-violence-ohio-alabama-justice-department-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/ZMK2-6XBR].
94. See Section III.A.
95. See Sections III.A–C.  There are varying definitions of “access to justice.”  The
categories mentioned herein are meant to be representative rather than definitive or
exhaustive.  Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T. JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olp/access-
justice [https://perma.cc/9GJQ-CZVS] (last updated Oct. 24, 2018).
96. Id.
97. See infra notes 98–119 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., CORRS. CORP. OF AM., FORM 10-K 36 (Feb. 24, 2010), http://ir.corecivic.com
/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-k/0000950123-10-016309 [https://perma.cc/UTD5-9VDN]
(“We believe the long-term growth opportunities of our business remain very
attractive as insufficient bed development by our customers should result in a return
to the supply and demand imbalance that has been benefiting the private prison
industry.”).
99. See Cohen, supra note 49 (“The two largest for-profit prison companies in the United
States – GEO and Corrections Corporation of America – and their associates have
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by National Public Radio revealed “a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort 
to help draft and pass Arizona Senate Bill 1070 by an industry that 
stands to benefit from it: the private prison industry.”100  The 
enormous gulf dividing the political power harnessed by large 
corporations and the marginalized groups who suffer the 
consequences of over-criminalization increases the odds that the 
justice system will not deliver the fair and just outcomes envisioned 
by access to justice advocates, instead tending toward results that 
enrich the already powerful.101 
In addition to the legal but harmful lobbying efforts of for-profit 
incarceration corporations, privatization necessarily increases the 
avenues of corruption, often at the risk of harming marginalized 
communities.102  The seductive presence of wealth can influence 
decision-making at various points of the criminal justice process.103  
For example, a wide-ranging kickback scheme perpetrated by then-
Mississippi Department of Corrections Commissioner Christopher 
Epps touched on almost every aspect of imprisonment: construction 
of facilities, maintenance of those facilities, operation of those 
facilities, prisoner health care, commissary services, inmate 
telephone use, post-release tracking and monitoring, and drug 
testing.104  After investigating the scheme, Mississippi recovered 
$26.6 million in settlement agreements with the various private 
prisons and other companies involved in the scandal.105  
The corruptive effects of privatization have also touched judges.106 
In Pennsylvania, as described above, two juvenile court judges were 
involved in a scheme to close a county-run detention facility, forcing 
children into a privately-run center and sentencing juveniles to 
harsher punishments, including detention for behavior that would 
otherwise not merit such a sentence.107  This scheme, known as the 
funneled more than $10 million to candidates since 1989 and have spent nearly $25 
million on lobbying efforts.”). 
100. Sullivan, supra note 60.
101. See infra notes 102–19 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text; see infra notes 103–20 and
accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 104–19 and accompanying text.
104. Press Release, Jim Hood, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen. State of Miss.,




106. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
107. See Urbina, supra note 16.
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“kids-for-cash” scandal, resulted in, among other things, the suicide 
of one teenager, a guilty plea from one judge, and a criminal 
conviction of the other.108 
More recently, as illustrated above, an investigation alleged that the 
husband of a federal court judge increased his stock holdings of 
companies involved in private detention days before a large raid that 
resulted in almost 400 arrests.109  Court filings suggest that the judge 
knew about and took part in the planning of the raid for several 
months beforehand.110  These instances show that fairness in the legal 
system disappears when those involved with dispensing justice have 
a financial stake in the outcome, and even if no wrongdoing occurred 
in the case involving the federal judge, such financial entanglement 
strips away the appearance of fairness.111 
The avenues for corruption are not limited to the courthouse, as 
some of the largest companies involved in for-profit incarceration are 
now expanding into areas adjacent to their core business, many of 
which prey on communities of color and poor communities.112  GEO 
Group, for example, lists post-release services on their website, 
including “programs tailored to pretrial, parole, probation, in-custody 
populations and those involved in immigration proceedings.”113 
Unfortunately, these services are also ripe for abuse.114  In Georgia, 
one company settled a case for $1.5 million based on “illegally 
throwing [the plaintiffs] in jail for not paying supervision fees and 
fines for traffic offenses or minor crimes like public intoxication.”115   
108. The Associated Press, Mom Blames Son’s Suicide on Luzerne County Judge in ‘Kids
for Cash’ Case, PENN LIVE, https://www.pennlive.com/midstate/2011/02/mom_
blames_luzerne_county_judg.html [https://perma.cc/JY3C-QHUA] (last updated Jan.
6, 2019); Pennsylvania Judge Gets 28 Years in ‘Kids for Cash’ Case, NBC NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44105072/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/pennsylvania-
judge-gets-years-kids-cash-case/#.Xi25a8hKiUl [https://perma.cc/ELK5-6955] (last
updated Aug. 11, 2011).
109. Michaels, supra note 69.
110. See id.
111. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
113. GEO Continuum of Care, GEO GROUP, INC., https://www.geogroup.com/geos_
continuum_of_care [https://perma.cc/B7AH-8LJV] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
114. See Rutherford County, TN: Private Probation, C.R. CORPS, http://www.civilrights
corps.org/work/criminalization-of-poverty/rutherford-county-tn-private-probation
[https://perma.cc/7ZFU-QAHY] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020); see also Rhonda Cook,
Private Probation Company Settles Lawsuits for More than $2 Million, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/private-probation-company-
settles-lawsuits-for-more-than-million/mkHQH9KFMSBNC4E8b
K6QzM/ [https://perma.cc/RP65-FUJ3].
115. Cook, supra note 114.
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And in Tennessee, Civil Rights Corps reached “a landmark 
settlement in a first-of-its-kind class action case . . . against 
Rutherford County and PCC, Inc., a private probation company that 
made millions of dollars over more than a decade by exploiting the 
poorest people in Rutherford County.”116  That lawsuit, which ended 
with a $14.3 million settlement, “alleged an unconstitutional 
racketeering enterprise between the County and the for-profit 
probation company to extort money from impoverished people”; as a 
result, the probation company went out of business, and Rutherford 
County agreed, inter alia, to prevent future privatization of its 
probation system.117 
Private companies continue to expand into new profit-making areas 
and make decisions that lead to unjust outcomes for vulnerable 
groups, including a recent agreement between Cook County, Illinois 
and Track Group for ankle monitors capable of two-way 
communication.118  The technology enables employees at Track 
Group’s monitoring center to initiate a call with the juvenile that 
cannot be declined and includes both speaking and monitoring, all of 
which is recorded and remains available for any purpose, including 
criminal investigation.119   
These episodes represent a preview of what is to come if 
government entities continue the process of privatizing justice.  
Introducing profit into the justice system thwarts fairness, often by 
placing additional burdens on poor and minority groups, which is 
antithetical to the concept of fair and just outcomes that is 
fundamental to the idea of access to justice.120 
B. Increasing Efficiency
The Department of Justice also recognizes as a core principle of
access to justice that the judicial system should deliver “fair and just 
outcomes effectively, without waste or duplication.”121  At first 
blush, private, for-profit incarceration seems a good match for 
increasing efficiency because producing greater efficiency is a core 
116. Rutherford County, TN: Private Probation, supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. See Kira Lerner, Chicago’s Ankle Monitors Can Call and Record Kids Without Their




120. See supra notes 96–119 and accompanying text.
121. Access to Justice, supra note 95.
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promise of these businesses,122 but they have failed to deliver on that 
promise.123  Empirical research into this question is ongoing, and at 
this point is not conclusive because widescale for-profit incarceration 
is a relatively new phenomenon.124  However, a growing body of 
studies suggests that private facilities are at best equally efficient,125 
and in many cases are significantly less efficient.126  An early meta-
analysis of twenty-four independent studies in 1999 revealed no 
statistically significant difference in per diem cost of an individual 
prisoner in public or private facilities, whether such facility was 
minimum-, medium-, or maximum-security.127  
More recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
collected information from states and the federal government and 
published the results.128  The Arizona Auditor General found that it 
was costlier to house prisoners in private facilities for “both 
minimum- and medium-custody beds – the two categories of beds for 
which the [Arizona Department of Corrections] contracts.”129  A 
committee in Monmouth County, New Jersey recommended against 
private prisons because of potentially “increased risk of liability and 
safety risks without proof of cost savings.”130  In a separate memo 
from then-Attorney General Sally Yates, she noted that: 
[T]ime has shown that [private prisons] compare poorly to
our own Bureau facilities. They simply do not provide the
same level of correctional services, programs, and
resources; they do not save substantially on costs; and as
noted in a recent report by the Department’s Office of
Inspector General, they do not maintain the same level of
safety and security.131
122. See HARTNEY & GLESMANN, supra note 25.
123. See infra notes 124–38 and accompanying text.
124. See Travis C. Pratt & Jeff Maahs, Are Private Prisons More Cost-Effective than
Public Prisons? A Meta-Analysis of Evaluation Research Studies, 45 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 358, 358 (1999).
125. See id. at 358–59.
126. See id. at 359.
127. Id. at 358.
128. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 6–7.
129. Id. at 19.
130. Id. (emphasis omitted).
131. Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Justice to
Acting Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
opa/file/886311/download [https://perma.cc/5THE-8VG9].
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And while there are a small sample of studies that have found 
minimal cost reduction, those purported savings often result from 
unpalatable cost-cutting.132  For example, in a careful examination of 
nine states that housed at least 3000 prisoners in private prisons, 
Christopher Petrella found that people of color were overrepresented 
in private facilities relative to their public counterparts and that this 
outcome was the result of “finely tailored contractual provisions that 
implicitly exempt private prison companies from housing certain 
types of individuals whose health care and staffing costs 
disproportionately attenuate profit margins.”133  Or, stated another 
way, private prisons cherry pick the inmates they would most like to 
house because those prisoners are healthy and active, thereby 
providing greater profit margins in saving on healthcare costs and 
exploiting for labor gains.134 
Other studies find inimicable cost-reduction in services that 
otherwise provide inmates with well-documented societal benefits.135  
Two researchers recently examined recidivism rates of similar 
prisoners housed in public and private facilities in Oklahoma and 
found that when holding other factors constant, people in general 
were more likely to recidivate when they spent more time in a private 
prison, and that men in private facilities were particularly more likely 
to recidivate.136  Another study found that private prisons are staffed 
by fewer guards, and those guards are less qualified and undertrained 
compared to their public counterparts; those factors were 
hypothesized to account for the fact that private facilities are more 
dangerous, both for prisoners and staff, due to higher rates of 
violence.137  Similar findings in a report by the Office of Inspector 
General comparing federal prisons to private facilities served as a key 
reason that the Department of Justice under President Obama decided 
to phase out the use of privately contracted facilities, although that 
132. See Christopher Petrella, The Color of Corporate Corrections, Part II: Contractual
Exemptions and the Overrepresentation of People of Color in Private Prisons, in 3
RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY 81, 82–83 (2014).
133. Id. at 82–83.
134. See id.
135. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text; see infra notes 136–38 and
accompanying text.
136. Andrew L. Spivak & Susan F. Sharp, Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private
Prison Performance, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 482, 499–500 (2008).
137. See Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons: A
Comparison of Select Characteristics, 68 FED. PROB. 27 (2004); see also BAUER,
supra note 4, at 40, 142–43, 252–53.
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decision, but not the underlying evidence, was reversed by Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions.138 
Private, for-profit prisons have not lived up to their promised 
efficiency, and ensuring access to justice requires that outcomes are 
delivered effectively and without waste, a result that private prison 
companies have not been able to produce.139  The cost-cutting 
mechanisms employed to deliver profits to shareholders have not led 
to cheaper incarceration, and as researchers continue to gather and 
analyze data from the growing privately-incarcerated population, a 
strong body of evidence is showing that cost-cutting measures result 
in less-safe prisons with fewer opportunities for successful 
rehabilitation.140 
C. Promoting Accessibility
Finally, the Office for Access to Justice aims to eliminate “barriers
that prevent people from understanding and exercising their 
rights,”141 which is a goal that private, for-profit incarceration hinders 
in at least two ways.142  First, in many states, it is harder to access 
information from private prisons than their public counterparts.143  
Public facilities are subject to certain records requests, while private 
facilities often are not.144  
Second, funding is a core part of democratic engagement for 
criminal justice.145  Traditionally, voters can exercise their direct 
democratic voting rights to approve or disapprove of bonds for prison 
construction.146  This activity serves as an important check on 
prosecutorial conduct by limiting the amount of people that can be 
138. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS (Aug. 2016), https://oig.justice.gov/
reports/2016/e1606.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRX3-EN73]; Memorandum from Jefferson
B. Sessions III, Attorney Gen. U.S. Office of the Attorney Gen., to Acting Dir. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/2017
0224_doj_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/K955-88GV].
139. See supra notes 121–38 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 72–85 and accompanying text.
141. Access to Justice, supra note 95.
142. See infra notes 143–51 and accompanying text.
143. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Private Prisons Lock Up Thousands of Americans with




145. See infra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
146. Dana C. Joel, The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons: Issues and Evidence, in
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 51, 58 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds.,
1993).
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incarcerated at any one point.147  Data in this area is hard to come by, 
but throughout the 1980s, “an average of 60 percent of all local 
referenda for jail bonds was rejected.”148  State legislators can bypass 
voters on this front, however, by contracting with a private company 
who invests the capital for construction of the facility and drawing 
funds for a contract (as long as twenty years in many states) from the 
state’s general coffers.149  In this way, private prisons narrow the 
ability of people to exercise their rights to participate in setting the 
boundaries of criminal justice spending to only voting for 
representatives.150  And as discussed above, the concentrated interest 
of private prison corporations means they will spend large sums of 
money lobbying and donating to individual legislators to capture 
their support.151    
Far from increasing society’s access to justice by removing barriers 
to exercising individuals’ rights, private, for-profit incarceration tilts 
the balance of power toward small groups of wealthy and politically 
connected organizations.152 
IV. SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OF FOR-
PROFIT INCARCERATION
Private for-profit incarceration raises profound constitutional 
concerns.  The recent renaissance of the private incarceration 
industry means the United States court systems have not yet fully 
addressed the problem.153  In Israel, however, a petition to its 
Supreme Court was filed shortly after legislation authorizing private 
operation of prisons passed the Knesset.154  The Supreme Court of 
Israel eventually found the entirety of the authorizing legislation 
invalid because it violated Basic-Law: Human Dignity and 
147. See id. at 57.
148. Id. at 58.
149. See id. at 58–59.
150. See id. at 57–59.
151. See supra notes 45–66 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 141–51 and accompanying text; see supra Part II.
153. See Private Prison Contractors Can’t Stand in the Way of the Public’s Right to Know,
CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Aug. 28, 2017), https://ccrjustice.org/home/blog/2017/08/28/
ccr-news-private-prison-contractors-can-t-stand-way-public-s-right-know
[https://perma.cc/295C-9C34].
154. Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme Court
Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 INT. J. CONST. L. 690, 696 (2010)
(clarifying that the Knesset is both the Legislative branch and the Constitutive
assembly of Israel).
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Liberty.155  That decision is instructive both because United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Israeli Basic-Law explicitly 
recognize human dignity as central to a person’s liberty interest156 
and because the reasoning relied exclusively on legal principles 
rather than any kind of cost-benefit analysis offered by 
privatization.157  
Private, for-profit incarceration in the United States implicates at 
least six distinct constitutional doctrines: 1) the private nondelegation 
doctrine;158 2) the right to an unbiased adjudicator protected by due 
process;159 3) the fundamental right to be treated like a person rather 
than like property protected by substantive due process and equal 
protection;160 4) procedural due process concerns related to 
substantial risks of erroneous deprivations of liberty;161 5) the 
prohibition on slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment;162 and 6) the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment.163  Below, we argue that private, for-profit incarceration 
violates each of these constitutional protections, or, at a minimum, 
raises serious questions of constitutional law that must be 
addressed.164 
A. Nondelegation
Private incarceration represents “delegation in its most obnoxious
form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests 
may be and often are adverse to the interests of” the incarcerated.165 
The “intelligible principles” test may have rendered the public 
nondelegation doctrine toothless; “[n]ot so, however, in the case of 
private entities to whom the Constitution commits no executive 
power.”166  Although courts have not explicitly delineated the 
155. Id.
156. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that personal
dignity is “central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
157. See Medina, supra note 154, at 704–06.
158. See infra Section IV.A.
159. See infra Section IV.B.
160. See infra Section IV.C.
161. See infra Section IV.D.
162. See infra Section IV.E.
163. See infra Section IV.F.
164. See infra Sections IV.A–F.
165. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
166. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Trans. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43 (2015).
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structural underpinnings of the private nondelegation doctrine,167 two 
main themes drive their decisions: first, core governmental functions 
cannot be delegated to private parties;168 and second, executive 
branches cannot grant legal enforcement power to entities outside the 
government over whom the executive does not exercise control.169 
Each of these themes point toward the result that private 
incarceration violates the United States Constitution.170  
1. Core Government Function
It is beyond dispute that essential government functions must be
exercised by their respective branches.171  For example, in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry, the Supreme Court assumed that only Congress 
could “perform[] its essential legislative function” of creating 
generally applicable rules of behavior.172  Likewise, the Court has 
explained that enforcing the laws and appointing and having control 
over the officers charged with the duty of enforcing those laws is 
exclusively an executive function.173  In these cases, the task the 
Court faces is determining whether the challenged behavior 
constitutes a government function exclusive to that branch.174  It is 
hard to imagine a task more quintessential to executive authority than 
incarceration.  The Supreme Court has been hesitant to define 
essential government functions175 and has never directly addressed 
whether incarceration is a government power susceptible of 
delegation.176   
167. Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 623–24 (2018).
168. See infra Section IV.A.1.
169. See infra Section IV.A.2.
170. See infra Sections IV.A.1–2.
171. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
172. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–30 (1935).
173. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122, 176 (1926).
174. See A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 529–30; see Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
175. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (“Our
examination of this ‘function’ standard applied in these and other cases over the last
eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state
regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism . . . .”).
176. Stacey Jacovetti, Note, The Constitutionality of Prison Privatization: An Analysis of
Prison Privatization in the United States and Israel, 6 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 61, 64
(2016).
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Supporters of privatization argue that delegation can be proper 
when coupled with sufficient oversight and regulation;177 however, 
the nature of incarceration requires jailers to exercise authority 
quickly and decisively.178  In these types of situations, oversight is 
meaningless because government authority cannot intervene quickly 
enough to prevent oversteps.179  Further, any remedies available to 
the inmate are necessarily post hoc, and courts—aware of the quick-
moving and fraught circumstances of imprisonment—are hesitant to 
question jailers’ decision-making.180 
Other sources of thought, however, suggest that restriction of 
liberty is among the powers most closely intertwined with the 
concept of sovereignty such that only government entities may 
legitimately effect significant restriction of a person.181  The Supreme 
Court of Israel, for example, ruled that privatization of prisons 
violated the Basic-Law.182  That decision started from the principle 
that the “right to personal liberty is without doubt one of the most 
central and important basic rights in any democracy.”183  Legal 
academia also generally recognizes the close tie between 
incarceration and sovereignty.184  And likewise, the state’s 
“monopoly” on force185 as coercion is fundamental to many 
177. See id. at 67.
178. See BAUER, supra note 4, at 228–29, 252–53 (describing the numerous stabbings and
assaults that take place inside private prisons).
179. See id.
180. See Editorial Board, Holding Prison Guards Accountable, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/opinion/prison-guards-new-york.html
[https://perma.cc/88L6-XEED].
181. See infra notes 182–89 and accompanying text.
182. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD 27, 34
(2009) (Isr.), http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Israel_Ruling.pdf [https://perma.c
c/9EXB-UMFG].
183. Id. at 58.  The Israeli court recognized that right is not absolute, however, and
restriction is proper when a person violates certain laws.  Id. at 59.  The identity of the
entity restricting the liberty interest was crucial to their analysis because such
restriction is only legitimate when done for the public interest—in the case of
incarceration, the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment.  Id. at 60.
184. The legal academic writing in this area covers vast swaths, from the historical, see
Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004), to the philosophically
normative, see Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J.
437 (2005), and from the strictly constitutional, see Alexander Volokh, The
Constitutional Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983 (2011), to the
economic, see John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114
MICH. L. REV. 951 (2016).
185. The Constitution explicitly recognizes one instance through which Congress can
authorize private parties to exercise coercive force: the Marque and Reprisal Clause.
2020] Abolishing Private Prisons 285 
philosophical accounts of political legitimacy, from Thomas 
Hobbes186 to John Rawls187 and from Max Weber188 to Ronald 
Dworkin.189 
These sources state with a nearly uniform voice that incarceration 
is inherently entwined with statehood, and the Supreme Court relies 
on them as persuasive authorities when confronting constitutional 
issues.190  Recently, the Court referred to the Declaration of 
Independence as evidence for how to interpret the Second 
Amendment.191  Additionally, John Locke was cited at length by two 
Justices in the dissent of Obergefell v. Hodges,192 and Ronald 
Dworkin’s delineation of two meanings of “discretion” was 
important to the majority in Board of Pardons v. Allen.193  Finally, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  This Clause enshrined the Revolutionary War practice 
of dressing the actions of privateers in the cloak of government to redress injuries 
done to the state.  See C. Kevin Marshall, Comment, Putting Privateers in Their 
Place: The Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 958–60 (1997).  Because the Constitution explicitly recognizes
this single instance of private exercise of public power, other such delegations are
constitutionally suspect.  See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 432 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that expressio unius
est exclusio alterius is a common-sense interpretive canon that reveals drafters’ intent
to exclude similar items not explicitly listed when at least one item is listed).
186. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 126 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651) (“Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with
riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with
ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath formerly made . . . .”).
187. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 136 (expanded ed. 2005) (“Second, political
power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of sanctions, for
government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws.”).
188. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (“Of course, force is certainly
not the normal or the only means of the state—nobody says that—but force is a means
specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially
intimate one.”).
189. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 190–91 (1986).
190. See infra notes 191–99 and accompanying text.
191. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 586 (2008).  The dissent also cited
the Declaration of Independence.  Id. at 640–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613, 2634, 2636–38 (2015) (Roberts, J. and
Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The founding-era understanding of liberty was heavily
influenced by John Locke, whose writings ‘on natural rights and on the social and
governmental contract’ were cited ‘[i]n pamphlet after pamphlet’ by American
writers.” (quoting BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 27 (1967)).
193. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375 (1987) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (1977)).
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the Court explicitly relies on foreign law for the understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on unusual punishment,194 and at least one 
Justice has explained that foreign courts can be sources of wisdom 
for the United States Supreme Court.195   
Of note too, is the fact that state courts have been more active in 
invalidating delegations of executive and legislative authority.196 
While the federal Supreme Court has rarely addressed the 
nondelegation doctrine,197 state courts have developed a relatively 
large body of caselaw, even if it suffers from inconsistency.198  For 
example, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated an initiative 
that would have required every piece of tax legislation passed by the 
legislature to be approved in a statewide referendum because it 
unconstitutionally delegated the legislative power to the people at 
large.199 
The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed this growing body of state 
decisions in Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. 
Lewellen, a case that is important not only for its holding that the 
“[l]egislature made an unconstitutionally broad delegation of 
authority to the Foundation, a private entity,” but also because it 
contains reasoned judicial analysis of the private nondelegation 
doctrine in the face of the modern administrative state that relies on 
public-private partnerships to accomplish a wide variety of goals.200  
In fact, one concern with the nondelegation doctrine is the sweeping 
breadth suggested by some statements of its principles.201  For 
example, in Texas Boll Weevil, the court stated the general position 
(one that is echoed throughout opinions addressing the nondelegation 
194. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (“It is proper that we
acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and
emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.”).
195. See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court,
and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/us
/12ginsburg.html [https://perma.cc/8UQF-UHEV] (“Why shouldn’t we look to the
wisdom of a judge from abroad with at least as much ease as we would read a law
review article written by a professor?”).
196. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 806 (Wash. 2000).
197. See Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 167, at 634.
198. See id. at 645 (“Ultimately, the nondelegation doctrine is notable not for its demise
during the New Deal revolution but rather for its surprising persistence through the
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.”).
199. See Amalgamated Transit, 11 P.3d at 806.
200. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex.
1997).
201. Id. at 469 (citing George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American
Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 659 (1975)).
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doctrine) that “[t]he power to pass laws rests with the Legislature, 
and that power cannot be delegated to some commission or other 
tribunal.”202 
However, “these blanket pronouncements should not be read too 
literally” because the demands of a functioning society require that 
“the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not 
over a point of principle but over a question of degree.”203  To this 
end, after finding inspiration from opinions of other states’ highest 
courts and articles from legal academia, the Texas Supreme Court 
announced eight factors to weigh when deciding whether any 
particular delegation to a private party is proper: 
1. Are the private delegate’s actions subject to meaningful
review by a state agency or other branch of state
government?  2. Are the persons affected by the private
delegate’s actions adequately represented in the decision
making process?  3. Is the private delegate’s power limited
to making rules, or does the delegate also apply the law to
particular individuals?  4. Does the private delegate have a
pecuniary or other personal interest that may conflict with
his or her public function?  5. Is the private delegate
empowered to define criminal acts or impose criminal
sanctions?  6. Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent,
and subject matter?  7. Does the private delegate possess
special qualifications or training for the task delegated to it?
8. Has the Legislature provided sufficient standards to guide
the private delegate in its work?204
We suggest neither that these eight factors are exclusive nor that all 
courts should use this exact list; but, together, these factors do 
encompass many concerns at the heart of delegation.205  However, 
applying this exemplary list to private for-profit incarceration, 
questions two, three, four, five, and six clearly point in favor of 
finding delegation of incarceration to private for-profit corporations 
unconstitutional, and arguably questions one and seven point in the 
202. Id. at 466 (quoting Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tex.
1935).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 471–72.
205. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647,
659–60 (1986).
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same direction.206  Particularly troublesome are the factors that 
denote that a private delegate having a pecuniary interest that 
conflicts with his or her public function (factor four) and that the 
private delegate is able to define criminal acts and impose sanctions 
(factor five) are unmistakably implicated in private for-profit 
incarceration as particularly highlighted above.207  Notably, the 
dissenting opinion expressed concern that this test would have 
“unknown ramifications” to, among other delegations, private prisons 
in Texas.208 
2. Modern Revival in Federal Court
Recently, several Justices of the Supreme Court (and, in fact,
judges on appellate courts)209 have shown an eagerness to address the 
increasing delegation of powers constitutionally assigned to the 
legislative and executive branches.210  Justice Alito sided with the 
majority in Department of Transportation v. Association of American 
Railroads (AAR), finding that Amtrak is a federal actor for 
constitutional purposes.211  His separate concurrence, however, 
provided one focus for modern judges analyzing the problem of 
delegation: political accountability.212  Justice Alito noted that all 
officers of the United States take an oath or affirmation to support the 
Constitution, and “[t]here is good reason to think that those who have 
not sworn an oath cannot exercise significant authority of the United 
States.”213  Further, “[t]hose who exercise the power of Government” 
are subject to special restraints because of the exercise of that 
power.214  The Court has been hesitant to “enforce the nondelegation 
doctrine with more vigilance [because] the other branches of 
Government have vested powers of their own . . . however, there is 
not even a fig leaf of  constitutional justification” when dealing with 
delegations to private entities because they are not vested with 
legislative or executive powers.215 
206. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part II.
208. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 952 S.W.2d. at 492 (Cornyn, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
209. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417–19 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (per curiam).
210. See infra notes 211–28 and accompanying text.
211. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 56 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
212. See id. at 56–57.
213. Id. at 57.
214. Id. at 58.
215. Id. at 61–62.
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Under Justice Alito’s theory, courts should doctrinally split 
nondelegation analysis into two distinct camps: public and private.216 
Analysis of public delegation is complex because for any given 
activity, one could classify it as part of the legislative, executive, or 
judicial powers.217  For example, the activity at issue in AAR exhibits 
some hallmarks of executive power (initiating oversight by the 
Surface Transportation Board) and some legislative actions (crafting 
metrics and minimum standards for train operations).218  Therefore, 
determining whether the entity exercising that power is properly part 
of the executive or legislative branch may be a futile exercise for 
courts.219  When a private entity exercises legislative or executive 
powers, however, no such problem is present: a private party simply 
cannot exercise either legislative or executive power.220  
Justice Alito recognized gradations of concern when dealing with 
private delegation, noting that Congress authorizing citizen suits 
raises grave concerns while delegating regulatory power is delegation 
“in its most obnoxious form.”221  Restricting liberty in the process of 
enforcing the law fits squarely in the executive branch powers,222 and 
as discussed above, the nature of incarceration means that delegation 
of that function necessarily entails private parties exercising coercive 
authority that is reviewable only after the fact, when monetary 
remuneration may be a poor substitute for the vindication of 
constitutional rights.223  Given the grave problems with public 
accountability implicated by private incarceration, the industry likely 
runs afoul of Justice Alito’s conception of the nondelegation 
doctrine.224 
Justice Thomas also concurred with the AAR majority’s 
disposition, but did not join the analysis “because it fail[ed] to fully 
correct the errors that require us to vacate” the decision.225  His 
concurrence focused on the structure of the Constitution,226 noting 
216. See id. at 60.
217. See id. at 58–61.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 61.
220. See id. at 62.
221. See id. (quoting Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)).
222. See supra Section IV.A.1.
223. See Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. at 61–62 (Alito, J., concurring).
224. See id.
225. Id. at 67 (Thomas, J., concurring).
226. This concurrence accompanied two others that Justice Thomas filed recently
addressing nondelegation.  In Michigan v. EPA, Justice Thomas argued that Chevron
deference potentially violates the vesting clauses of either Article III (because it
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that the grants of legislative, executive, and judicial power are 
exclusive, so “[w]hen the Government is called upon to perform a 
function that requires an exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial 
power, only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.”227 
After delineating the legislative power, Thomas further explained 
that “although the Constitution is less specific about how the 
President shall exercise power, it is clear that he may carry out his 
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed with the aid of 
subordinates.”228  
Taken together, the Alito and Thomas concurrences229 demonstrate 
a renewed interest in the nondelegation doctrine at the Supreme 
Court,230 and because incarceration is such a fundamentally executive 
function, the constitutionality and practice of incarcerating people for 
profit deserves, at a minimum, a full and reasoned decision.231 
B. Biased Adjudicator
The Due Process Clause prohibits adjudication by an interested
party.232  In particular, it violates the Due Process Clause if an 
average person in the adjudicator’s position is likely to be partial.233  
Private, for-profit prisons act as adjudicators in varying degrees over 
the inmates in their facility by, for example, issuing negative 
allows agencies to interpret statutes) or Article I (because it allows agencies to create 
generally applicable rules).  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, he wrote that 
Seminole Rock deference – under which courts defer to agency interpretation of 
regulations – “represents a transfer of judicial power to the Executive Branch, and it 
amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political 
branches.”  Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015).  In all three of 
these cases, Thomas closely analyzes the constitutional separation of powers and how 
continuing deference and delegation may violate the careful allocation intended by the 
drafters.  See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712–2714 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Perez, 
575 U.S. at 112–33 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. at 66–
69 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
227. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. at 68.
228. Id.
229. Additionally, the majority opinion from the D.C. Circuit provided a thorough and
convincing analysis that the delegation to Amtrak violated the private nondelegation
doctrine.  See Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 674–77
(D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded, 575 U.S. 43 (2015).  The conclusion that
Amtrak was a private actor was overturned, so the Supreme Court did not address the
merit of the nondelegation analysis.  See Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. at 55.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 212–28.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 171–80.
232. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
233. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1980).
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behavior determinations, classifying and assigning individuals to 
different units, deciding who is eligible for educational or work 
programs, and determining the eligibility status of early release or 
good time release.234 
In Tumey v. Ohio, the Supreme Court reviewed a state statute 
through which town mayors sat as judges, and if a defendant was 
convicted, fees and fines assessed against the defendant could be kept 
by the municipality.235  Additionally, some municipalities passed 
ordinances that allowed the mayor to keep the fees allocated to the 
municipality; as a result, mayors were sitting as judges in cases 
where they would personally receive fees and fines assessed to a 
defendant they found guilty.236  In striking down such an 
arrangement, the Court noted: 
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to 
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof 
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him 
not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the 
state and the accused denies the latter due process of law.237 
Since Tumey, the Court has expanded on the principle that a judge 
cannot preside over a case in which she has a direct financial 
incentive without violating the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution; in particular, the Court has decided that the Clause is 
violated when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge 
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”238   
For example, the Court overturned a conviction when a mayor 
presided over the trial and fees from that trial went to the town’s 
general fisc, over which the mayor also had control.239  Likewise, the 
Due Process Clause was violated where an Alabama Supreme Court 
Justice voted to uphold punitive damages in one case while he was a 
lead plaintiff in a similar case in the lower court.240  And most 
recently and expansively, the Court required recusal when the owner 
of a company found liable in a tort case made large donations to a 
234. See BAUER, supra note 4, at 41–66.
235. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 516–18 (1927).
236. Id. at 518–21.
237. Id. at 532.
238. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
239. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
240. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986).
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West Virginia Supreme Court candidate who was elected and 
eventually heard an appeal of the underlying case.241 
For-profit incarceration violates the biased adjudicator doctrine of 
the Due Process Clause if either (1) decision-making inside of a 
private prison operates with a bias that negatively affects prisoners, 
or (2) political influence of private prison corporations has an 
impermissibly large influence on adjudicators.242  Recent evidence 
indicates that private prison operators are violating the biased 
adjudicator doctrine on both counts, thereby contravening the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution.243 
C. Fundamental Rights Protected by Substantive Due Process and
Equal Protection
The Constitution also ensures that some rights are not infringed by 
the government, regardless of the amount of safeguarding 
procedures.244  Here, not being treated like a slave is a fundamental 
right that the government cannot infringe upon without showing that 
it has a compelling interest in doing so, and that any infringement is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that end.245  The argument is both 
historical—widespread corporate private imprisonment was not a 
government practice until fairly recently246—and modern—states and 
nations are moving away from the practice as experience and 
evidence proves the theory that for-profit incarceration does not save 
money and results in worse outcomes for prisoners.247 
The Constitution protects fundamental rights under two different 
doctrines: substantive due process248 and equal protection.249  If it is a 
fundamental right, any government interference must meet the high 
strict scrutiny standard, under which the government must show that 
the interference is supported by a compelling interest and the 
instantiation of the interference is the most narrowly drawn means of 
241. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009); see also cummings,
Procuring ‘Justice’?, supra note 65, at 99–102 (describing the factual underpinnings
of the Caperton v. Massey case where judicial recusal was ordered).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 223–32.
243. See BAUER, supra note 4, at 49–67.
244. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125–28 (1990).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 238–40; see also infra text accompanying notes
246–53.
246. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 5.
247. Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Justice to
Acting Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, supra note 131.
248. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV.
625, 627 (1992).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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achieving the government’s compelling goal.250  If the right is not 
fundamental, generally the government must only show that the 
action is rationally related to a legitimate interest (and courts are 
extremely reluctant to invalidate state action under this standard).251  
Examples of fundamental rights protected under substantive due 
process demanding the highest protection include “the right to marry, 
rights with respect to procreation, sexual activity (including private 
consensual homosexual activity), and medical care decision-
making.”252  Under equal protection, courts have protected the right 
to vote, the right to travel, and the right not to be discriminated 
against based on race or ethnicity.253 
Increasingly, these rights are being interpreted as interconnected.254  
For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court imported some 
principles traditionally relied on in due process cases to its equal 
protection analysis: the opinion explicitly rejected the conclusion that 
undocumented immigrant children were a suspect class—the usual 
way to reach heightened scrutiny under equal protection—and further 
rejected the conclusion that public education itself was a fundamental 
right.255  However, the Court found its way to heightened scrutiny 
because although access to public education was not quite 
fundamental and the children did not quite represent a suspect class, 
the combination of the two deserved special protection.256  Further, 
Justice Kennedy explained the interplay between these clauses in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the case that protected the ability of same-sex 
couples to marry: 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
are connected in a profound way, though they set forth 
independent principles; rights implicit in liberty and rights 
250. Galloway, supra note 248, at 638.
251. See id. at 643-44.
252. Vincent J. Samar, At the Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection:
Expanding the Range of Protected Interests, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 87, 91 (2019)
(cataloging the history of fundamental rights cases protected by Substantive Due
Process).
253. Id. at 92-93.  It is worth noting that the Court has not always called these rights
“fundamental” in the equal protection context; nonetheless, they do receive strict
scrutiny protection and exhibit most of the same traits regardless of the label.  See
Strict Scutiny, L. LIBR. – AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.org/pages/10552/
Strict-Scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/9L9N-N69K] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
254. See infra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
255. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–23 (1982).
256. Id. at 230.
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secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts 
and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each 
may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other, 
and in any particular case one Clause may be thought to 
capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and 
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge 
in the identification and definition of the right.257 
This hybrid analysis fits neatly when examining the modern 
practice of private for-profit incarceration because the right not to be 
held like a slave for the benefit of another party implicates both types 
of concerns.258  Turning first to due process, the Supreme Court laid 
out the legal framework for determining whether a right is 
“fundamental,” noting that it does not rely on any formula; instead, 
“[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not 
set its outer boundaries.  That method respects our history and learns 
from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.”259 
The argument that for-profit incarceration violates the fundamental 
right not to be treated like a slave is both historical and modern.260  
The historical argument distinguishes the modern incarnation of 
private incarceration from the kinds of private jailing that existed 
historically.261  For example, although there was a practice in 
England of private innkeepers being given small payments to hold 
people before trial,262 that kind of arrangement does not bear the 
same hallmarks of slavery that modern for-profit incarceration does: 
in the latter case of for-profit incarceration, the private corporation 
has complete control over the prisoner for long periods of time, 
generates profit by the presence of the prisoner in a cell, increases 
margins by convincing or coercing the prisoner to labor in a variety 
of ways, and has the ability and incentive to increase recidivism by 
not providing access to successful rehabilitative programs.263   
257. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
258. See infra notes 259–67 and accompanying text.
259. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
260. See infra Section IV.E.1.
261. Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123-24 (2001).
262. See Dave Hill, Marshalsea Mansions of Misery, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2016, 2:34 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/davehillblog/2016/oct/29/marshalseas-
mansions-of-misery [https://perma.cc/767C-MR52].
263. See Noah Smith, Private Prisons Are a Failed Experiment, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1,
2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-01/u-s-
private-prisons-are-a-failed-government-experiment [https://perma.cc/3JTP-CDDZ].
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The modern portion of the argument points to the growing number 
of states and localities that have banned private incarceration,264 
organizations that have called for the same,265 and countries like 
Israel who have found the practice to violate core individual rights 
that are based on the same philosophical bases as the United 
States.266  In addition, even the countries who are allowing private 
incarceration to continue seem to be moving forward in a way that 
operates differently from how CoreCivic and GEO Group currently 
contract with state and federal agencies in the United States: in New 
Zealand, for example, at least one new private facility is purportedly 
being built with minimizing recidivism as a core principle which 
does not square with the profit motive present in the U.S.267   
However, even if this analysis does not quite result in strict 
scrutiny on its own, the inclusion of the principles of equal protection 
may provide assistance.268  As discussed above, prisoners in private 
for-profit facilities are likely to face a variety of negative 
consequences simply because they are assigned there rather than to a 
facility operated by the government.269  And like in Plyler, they do 
face these consequences as the result of a voluntary act rather than an 
innate characteristic they possess.270  But it seems starkly unfair to 
subject the category of people placed in these private facilities to 
worse consequences due to an arbitrary decision by the government 
agency.271 
We argue that this combination of fundamental right-adjacency and 
arbitrarily unfair consequences based on private categorization 
264. Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-
prisons/california-bans-private-prisons-and-immigration-detention-centers-idUSKBN
1WQ2Q9 [https://perma.cc/U854-RFJD].
265. Join the Movement!, supra note 37.
266. Angela E. Addae, Challenging the Constitutionality of Private Prisons: Insights from
Israel, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 527, 543 (2019).
267. See Rikha Sharma Rani, New Zealand Tries a Different Kind of Private Prison,
CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/08/new-zealand-
tries-a-different-kind-of-private-prison/538506 [https://perma.cc/TM4S-MY93]; see
also Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Down Under, More Humane Private Prisons, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINION (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/opinion/private-
prisons-australia-new-zealand.html [https://perma.cc/6EHX-SWGF].
268. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 260–67 and accompanying text.
270. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
271. See supra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.
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deserves the protection of heightened scrutiny provided by the 
interplay between substantive due process and equal protection.272 
D. Procedural Due Process
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses require
that the state or any private entity acting in concert with or on behalf 
of the state provide sufficient procedures to prevent unconstitutional 
deprivation of core rights, including life, liberty, and property.273  
Common sense, theory, and experience have shown that private, for-
profit incarceration negatively affects individuals: the prison 
corporation has every incentive to keep people in prison longer, make 
it more likely that the person returns to prison after release, and staff 
the facility with minimal, untrained staff, thereby depriving prisoners 
of life, liberty, or property.274  Requiring additional procedures to 
ensure that such deprivations do not occur is not prohibitive; in fact, 
research shows that if private facilities are in fact cheaper, all or most 
of the cost savings can be explained by the fact that private facilities 
tend to house prisoners that require fewer resources.275 
Generally, procedural due process focuses on whether the person 
challenging the outcome of any state action that deprived them of 
life, liberty, or property received adequate procedural safeguards.276  
For example, the landmark Mathews v. Eldridge case examined 
whether a Social Security beneficiary’s due process rights were 
violated when the federal government terminated those benefits 
without a prior evidentiary hearing.277  To answer the question, the 
Court developed a three-part test that balances (1) the importance of 
the private right at issue; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
that right given the procedures in place and the probable added value 
of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s 
interest, including the additional expense or other bureaucratic 
requirements for implementing the additional safeguards.278 
272. See supra notes 259–71 and accompanying text.
273. See Ann Woolhandler, Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests, 43 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 811, 821-22 (2016).




275. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
276. See Woolhandler, supra note 273, at 846-47.
277. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
278. See id. at 321.
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Each prong in the analysis arguably suggests that due process 
rights are violated by the current arrangement of private prison 
corporations.279  First, the liberty interest protected by due process is 
perhaps the most important type of interest, the literal freedom from 
physical restraint, and at a minimum, courts have indicated that any 
infringement of liberty will be examined very closely.280 
The second prong is somewhat more complicated, as it is not 
immediately clear what procedure a potential plaintiff would 
challenge.281  The most obvious answer is to challenge each 
individual transfer, arguing that whatever agency decision resulted in 
a plaintiff being moved to a private facility did not have sufficient 
safeguards to prevent the erroneous deprivation of rights inherent in 
the facilities to which they were transferred.282  To bolster this 
argument, the plaintiff could point to the kinds of contracts which 
may not have those inherent problems as a viable alternative.283      
The third prong is also complex.284  There is some lack of clarity 
(primarily in academic literature and inspector general reports from 
the federal government and various states) about whether private 
prison contracts save governments money or allow for greater 
flexibility; although a growing body of research suggests that if any 
money is saved at all it is minimal and probably depends on how the 
researcher accounts for different populations in different facilities.285  
But in terms of bureaucratic overhead, a paradox appears: for every 
additional procedure to safeguard a person’s rights in a private 
facility, the overseeing government entity must expend additional 
time and money.286  Thus, as governments increase the safeguards 
required to satisfy due process requirements, the scale tilts further 
towards violating the third prong of procedural due process 
279. See supra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
280. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
281. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 321.
282. See Douglas W. Dunham, Inmates’ Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1491–93 (1986) (discussing how decisions to transfer prisoners
to private prisons do not require due process safeguards).
283. For example, a New Zealand private prison facility has been designed from the
ground up with a focus on lowering recidivism rates.  See Rani, supra note 267.
284. See supra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
285. See Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Justice to
Acting Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, supra note 131.
286. See KARA GOTSCH & VINAY BASTI, CAPITALIZING ON MASS INCARCERATION: U.S. 
GROWTH IN PRIVATE PRISONS, SENT’G PROJECT (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/capitalizing-on-mass-incarceration-u-
s-growth-in-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/EPP6-LQVN].
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analysis.287  Therefore, we suggest here that a prisoner being held in a 
private for-profit incarceration facility can colorably argue that 
her/his procedural due process rights are being violated.288 
E. Slavery
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
sought to outlaw slavery in the United States: “[n]either slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”289 
This Amendment has been largely unexplored by the Supreme 
Court, particularly in the last century.290  However, a flurry of 
academic activity suggests a way forward for courts and litigants 
looking to apply the Thirteenth Amendment in novel factual 
scenarios.291  For example, the article The Thirteenth Amendment and 
Slavery in the Global Economy provides a roadmap for a modern 
understanding of “slavery” as a practice in the modern world.292  In 
particular, it describes “doctrinal tools—the same tools that pre-Civil 
War courts in free jurisdictions employed in combating the domestic 
institution of slavery while it was still alive, and that the post-Civil 
War Supreme Court employed in concluding that putatively 
‘voluntary’ peonage schemes could not survive Thirteenth 
Amendment scrutiny.”293  It concludes that “[a]ny analysis of forced 
labor in a new industrial context must afford a privileged place to 
[the owner/subject relationship], as the Court did in prohibiting the 
emerging peonage schemes of the early twentieth century.”294 
Other academics have suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment 
could operate to: (1) prohibit sexual slavery in prison perpetrated by 
one prisoner against another,295 (2) prohibit exploitative marriages 
where one spouse is an immigrant found through an international 
287. See id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
288. See supra notes 279–87 and accompanying text.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
290. See George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment in Legal Theory, 104 CORNELL L. 
REV. ONLINE 160, 160–61 (2019), https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/
cornell-law-review/Cornell-Law-Review-Online/upload/Rutherglen-essay-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7NQ-4678].
291. See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text.
292. Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global
Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1031–32 (2002).
293. Id. at 1032.
294. Id.
295. Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause
and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 642 (2008).
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matchmaking organization,296 (3) provide an alternative 
constitutional basis to support a woman’s right to abortion,297 and 
even (4) require the state to intervene to stop child abuse.298   
Drawing inspiration from this recent academic attention to the 
Thirteenth Amendment, we see three novel arguments suggesting 
that for-profit incarceration is unconstitutional: first, all incarceration 
is slavery, but the punishment clause allows the State and only the 
State to hold someone in the state of carceral slavery;299 second, even 
if all incarceration is not slavery, the commodification of prisoners 
when they are held in a private for-profit prison changes their status 
from indentured servitude to slave;300 and third, even if it is 
permissible to hold a prisoner as a slave, such action would require 
the legislature to authorize and the court to impose such punishment 
specifically.301 
Before turning to these legal arguments, we provide needed context 
for the claim that for-profit incarceration is a form of slavery by 
tracing the direct connection between slavery as practiced from pre-
colonial United States until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and addressing the understanding of the Punishment Clause that 
would permit slavery as punishment for a crime.302 
1. The Historical Line Between Chattel Slavery and For-Profit
Prisons
History provides a clear line between the chattel slavery that 
characterized the engine of American growth from the colonial 
period up through the Civil War and modern for-profit private 
prisons.303  At its core, chattel slavery represented the subjugation of 
black labor for the sole financial benefit of slave owners.304  The 
296. Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Comment, Abusive Mail-Order Bride Marriage and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1588–90 (2000).
297. Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 480, 483–85 (1990).
298. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1383–85
(1992).
299. See infra Sections IV.E.2–3.
300. See infra Section IV.E.4.
301. See infra Section IV.E.5.
302. See infra Sections IV.E.1–2.
303. See infra notes 304–22 and accompanying text.
304. See JUNIUS P. RODRIGUEZ, The Rise of “King Cotton” and the Economics of Slavery,
in 2 SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 107, 109–11 (Junius P. Rodriguez ed., 2007).
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relationship was marked by one individual being the property of and 
entirely subject to the demands of another.305  When the Civil War 
ended, northern abolitionists looked to enshrine the promise of the 
Emancipation Proclamation in the United States Constitution, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment was the result.306 
However, Reconstruction-era policies looked to institute slavery by 
different names: widespread indentured servitude that touched black 
lives much more harshly than white apprenticeships;307 “Coolie 
labor” aimed primarily at Asian immigrants, whether working in the 
United States or contracted by American corporations working 
abroad, such as at the Panama Canal;308 and various peonage 
systems, which operated throughout the southern United States, with 
different particulars depending on the locality.309  But a common 
theme of these systems, particularly in the South and particularly 
peonage, was a structural tool to bring black men into contact with 
the state’s legal arm through black codes and convict leasing, and 
thereby perpetually subjugate them for the benefit of others.310 
After the worst remnants of these systems were eradicated in the 
middle of the 20th century, there was a brief reprieve;311 however, 
with the burgeoning War on Drugs instituted and militarized in the 
305. See id. at 122–23.
306. See Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary
Abolitionism Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1801–
06 (2006) (detailing extensive impact of northern abolitionists on development of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
307. See JUNIUS P. RODRIGUEZ, Reconstruction: Are Liberty and Justice for All?, in 1 
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 304, at 143, 148–49; see also Margaret A. Burnham,
Property, Parenthood, and Peonage: Reflections on the Return to Status Quo
Antebellum, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 433, 440–43 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court
precedent on unconstitutional differences between white and black apprenticeships).
308. Panama Canal Laborers—Involuntary Servitude, 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 474, 480–82
(1905); see also Paul Finkelman, Coping with a New “Yellow Peril”: Japanese
Immigration, the Gentlemen’s Agreement and the Coming of World War II, 117 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1409, 1431–33 (2015) (explaining exploitation of Asian immigrant
laborers).
309. See Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 345, 351–
53 (1994) (discussing peonage system development in the South and Supreme Court
cases dealing with the same).
310. See id. at 353 (discussing surety system); see also Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes
and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil
Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2259–61 (1998) (discussing pervasive use of black
codes).
311. See Risa L. Goluboff, Race, Labor, and the Thirteenth Amendment in the 1940s
Department of Justice, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 889–93 (2007) (detailing actions to
eradicate racist peonage and surety systems and protect black citizens).
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1970s and 1980s,312 private corporations saw an opportunity to 
implement a new system that featured many of the markers of 
previous iterations of slavery with even closer entanglement with the 
state.313 
As prison population skyrocketed as a result of mandatory 
minimums and increased enforcement of drug crimes, state facilities 
became inadequate to hold the growing number of prisoners.314  
Private, for-profit entities stepped in to fill the gap.315  They devised 
contracts to build facilities to house this new population, which 
represented black males at a significantly higher rate than the general 
population.316  Several reasons underlie this disparity, including racist 
policing practices, sentencing guidelines that affected black male 
defendants in ways that other groups escaped, and wider government 
policies that kept black populations stuck in patterns of poverty (such 
as redlining housing areas).317   
The result is undeniable: young, black men are being incarcerated 
at staggeringly high rates.318  And to make matters worse, private 
prisons tend to house disproportionate rates of young black men 
because they represent the cheapest segment of prisoners: they are 
less likely to require the expensive medical care that often 
accompanies older and female prisoners.319 
312. RONALD CHEPESIUK, THE WAR ON DRUGS: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, at
xxviii (1999).
313. See cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 410–12.
314. See John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377,
377, 379–82 (2013) (detailing development of mass incarceration in United States);
see also Am. Civ. Liberties Union, Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in
the United States, UNITED NATIONS OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS. 1 (May
2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/OverIncarceration/ACLU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SAQ-MTCV] (discussing inadequate state facilities).
315. See cummings & Lamparello, supra note 23, at 411–12.
316. See id. at 409–12.
317. See id. at 407, 409–10, 434; see Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and Mortgage
Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
437, 451–52 (2018) (discussing redlining practices); see Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen.,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of
Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-
holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations
[https://perma.cc/TR47-CP9B] (discussing pervasive nature of disparate impact).
318. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 175–76.
319. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF AN AGING 
INMATE POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, at i–ii (2015),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z9F-UTMJ]
(detailing increased cost statistics for older inmates); NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
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Then, when the younger, overwhelmingly black male population 
arrives at the private facility, they are afforded fewer educational 
opportunities than their white counterpart population at public 
facilities;320 they work for less wages (at some private facilities, 
workers make pennies per hour, while public facilities often pay 
several dollars an hour, which is an indefensibly small amount, but 
an order of magnitude higher than the private prison population); 
they receive disciplinary decisions at a higher rate than public 
prisoners; and they ultimately spend more time incarcerated for the 
same crimes than if they were incarcerated in a public facility.321  It is 
no surprise that each of these differences is intimately linked to 
higher profits for the private corporation.322 
DELINQUENCY, THE SPIRAL OF RISK: HEALTH CARE PROVISION TO INCARCERATED
WOMEN 7, 20 (2006), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/ 
spiral-of-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ8T-FLE9] (detailing common health care issues 
of female prisoners); Rina Palta, Why For-Profit Prisons House More Inmates of 
Color, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2014, 7:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
codeswitch/2014/03/13/289000532/why-for-profit-prisons-house-more-inmates-of-
color [https://perma.cc/D8ES-SULR] (discussing selection of young people of color 
by private prisons). 
320. This condition reflects a similar disparity dating back to the late 19th century.  See In
re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C. Md. 1867) (discussing difference in treatment of
black and white indentured servants).
321. See BAUER, supra note 4, at 160 (discussing black inmates as majority of population
at private prison); see Anita Mukherjee, Does Prison Privatization Distort Justice?
Evidence on Time Served and Recidivism, SEMANTIC SCHOLAR 13, 23 (Mar. 8, 2016),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b1d8/
154954dd2d124b048b9083782e3aaed18a9f.pdf?_ga=2.231055835.510023849.15796
52499-4278527.1579652499 [https://perma.cc/ZX6E-6NF5] (summarizing data
showing inmates in private prisons serve longer sentences and are subject to more
disciplinary action); see also Clint Smith, Why the U.S. Is Right to Move Away from
Private Prisons, NEW YORKER (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/why-the-u-s-is-right-to-move-away-from-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/
G6P6-4AX7] (reporting lack of education provided to private prison inmates).
Compare BAUER, supra note 4, at 53 (detailing wage of two cents per hour in private
prison), with Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each
State?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/
2017/04/10/wages/ [https://perma.cc/U989-TJVU] (providing table of information on
inmate wages at public prison facilities).
322. Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of
Working Inmates, 27 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 679, 681–82 (2015) (discussing wages
designed to maximize profits); see also Mukherjee, supra note 321, at 23, 25
(detailing how inmates in private prison serve longer portions of their sentence to
increase profits); see also Smith, supra note 321 (reporting lack of education for
private prison inmates to increase profits).
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2. The Punishment Clause
Perhaps the most significant hurdle facing a successful challenge to
private incarceration based on the Thirteenth Amendment is the 
Punishment Clause.323  As noted above, the Thirteenth Amendment 
states that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist . . . .”324  If the Punishment Clause modifies 
both slavery and involuntary servitude, the challenge to private 
incarceration based on the Thirteenth Amendment relies on arguing 
that the Clause does not apply for some reason;325 however, such a 
conclusion is not foregone.326 
In fact, there are good reasons to think that this reading of the 
Amendment should not prevail.327  First, as a historical matter, 
research suggests that most congresspeople at the time the 
Amendment was drafted and passed believed that the language 
completely abolished slavery, particularly the Republicans 
responsible for writing the Amendment.328  And second, the 
alternative reading allows for full chattel slavery as a punishment for 
crime, which is an unlikely outcome.329  It would have allowed 
Reconstruction-era southern states to skirt the efficacy of the 
Amendment by implementing slavery as punishment for even minor 
crimes (something the drafters of the Amendment were concerned 
about preventing), and such a reading goes against modern mores and 
values.330  While southern states did implement convict leasing and 
black codes, essentially implementing slavery by another name (i.e., 
forced labor for those incarcerated on dubious charges), it did require 
an incarcerable offense first.331  Notably, these practices never 
reached the Supreme Court, and it is doubtful that the modern 
Supreme Court would uphold the practice of convict leasing given 
the evolution of societal norms, particularly the understanding that 
323. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 50, 69
(1872) (upholding servitude exception for punishment of crime).
324. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
325. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72 (1872).
326. See infra notes 328–33 and accompanying text.
327. See infra notes 328–30 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Ghali, supra note 295, at 625–27.
329. See id. at 627–28.
330. See id.
331. See BAUER, supra note 4, at 18–19.
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prisoners retain key human rights.332  Finally, some textual analysts 
have argued that the placement of the Punishment Clause after 
“indentured servitude” means that the Clause modifies only the term 
“indentured servitude” and not “slavery.”333   
3. All Incarceration Is Slavery, and Incarceration in For-Profit
Institutions Is Prohibited
The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment knew that the 
contemporaneous understanding of slavery encompassed 
incarceration, and they, therefore, included the Punishment Clause 
exception to preserve the ability of the government to punish 
people.334  The view that prison was a form of slavery is perhaps best 
summed up by an opinion from the Supreme Court of Virginia, 
where, describing a prisoner, the court stated: “He has, as a 
consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his 
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to 
him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.”335 
This view of prisoners has been somewhat softened, of course: 
Prisoners no longer forfeit all of their personal rights.336  However, 
Justice Christian, the author of the Ruffin decision, was not alone in 
his view of prisoners as slaves.337  Speaking shortly after the Civil 
War, prominent abolitionist Carl Schurz noted that “emancipation of 
the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old 
form could not be kept up.”338  In fact, he noted that the slaves were 
no longer considered to be property of a private party, instead the 
newly free man becomes the slave of society because “state 
legislation will share the tendency to make him such,” recognizing 
332. See Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment
Case Against State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 225–
229 (2009).
333. Becky Little, Does an Exception Clause in the 13th Amendment Still Permit Slavery?,
HISTORY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/13th-amendment-slavery-
loophole-jim-crow-prisons [https://perma.cc/T8YS-VK33].
334. James G. Pope, Mass Incarceration, Convict Leasing, and the Thirteenth Amendment:
A Revisionist Account, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1465, 1476 (2019) (“Sumner himself later
opined that the Senators had ‘supposed that the [Clause] was simply applicable to
ordinary imprisonment,’ rejecting his own view ‘that it might be extended so as to
cover some form of slavery.’”).
335. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
336. Do Inmates Have Rights? If So, What Are They?, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-
articles/do-inmates-have-rights-if-so-what-are-they-31517 [https://perma.cc/4HTX-
5BYK] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
337. See CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH 101 (1865) (ebook).
338. Id. at 179.
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that criminal convictions could lead to slavery, but not to the former 
master, to the government.339 
However, except for anti-abolitionists from the post-Civil War 
South, that exception was not meant to exempt private for-profit 
incarceration from the Amendment’s slavery prohibition.340  In fact, 
the Republican party responsible for the drafting and passage of the 
Amendment explicitly drew a line between normal incarceration, 
which often manifested in hard labor for the benefit of the State, and 
reimplementation of chattel slavery under the new name of convict 
leasing.341 
The current model of for-profit incarceration mirrors the model 
explicitly rejected by those responsible for the Thirteenth 
Amendment.342  Today, individuals are convicted of crimes, 
committed to the responsibility of a government agency for a period 
of time, and then sold to a corporation as part of a “lot” of 
unidentified prisoners so that the private prison corporation can make 
more money.343  The major difference is that these corporations are 
sophisticated enough not to require manual labor to make money; 
instead, the prisoner’s mere presence in his cell generates revenue by 
virtue of his appearance on a balance sheet.344  This transfer of funds 
from government to a private party on the back of an incarcerated 
person was not meant to be exempted by the Punishment Clause.345 
4. The Commodification of Prisoners Changes Their Status from
Prisoner to Slave
Even if one is not convinced that incarceration by itself is slavery, 
it becomes so when the prisoner is sold from a public facility to a 
private one to enrich his new jailer.346  Some people suggest that a 
Thirteenth Amendment suit by a non-forced laboring prisoner “is at 
least irrelevant and at most ludicrous” because it constitutes neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude to be incarcerated.347  Avoiding this 
outcome and successfully opening such a challenge to prisoners in 
for-profit facilities requires a close analysis of the private prison’s 
339. Id.
340. See Pope, supra note 334, at 1485–90.
341. Id.
342. See infra notes 343–45 and accompanying text.
343. See Marion, supra note 332, at 237.
344. See id. at 236.
345. See id. at 237.
346. See Marion, supra note 332, at 235–37.
347. Id.
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remuneration in the context of private incarceration as an industry.348  
For example, an examination of the operational structure of a private 
prison and how a prisoner adds value to the corporation through both 
his own labor—for example, by cleaning his cell, laundering outfits, 
or serving meals—and his meager living conditions shows how even 
a non-hard laboring prisoner is a slave because his body is being used 
to enrich the corporate owner.349  Viewing through this 
commodification lens differentiates the prisoner in a state prison 
(which is a drain on resources) and the prisoner in a private prison 
(whose continued incarceration represents an increased profit margin 
for the prison corporation).350   
Under this softened view, incarceration constitutes slavery only 
when a prisoner makes money for a private party.351  The key 
constitutional question then becomes whether slavery is permitted at 
all, rather than whether there is a distinction between slavery at the 
hands of the state and slavery for the benefit of a private party; and, 
as we discuss above, we think careful analysis of the Punishment 
Clause reveals that the exception applies only to indentured 
servitude.352  Therefore, because the prisoner becomes a slave once 
commodified and the Punishment Clause does apply to slavery, the 
practice of private for-profit incarceration is unconstitutional.353 
5. Imposition of Slavery Requires Specific Intention from
Legislature and Sentencing Judge
We also argue that if the Punishment Clause does allow a prisoner 
to be held as a slave, then the legislature must authorize such a 
punishment for specific crimes, and the sentencing judge must 
impose the punishment explicitly, rather than transfer to slave-like 
conditions as a corollary condition of the sentence.354 
The Supreme Court has stated that in the Eighth Amendment 
context, “punishment” requires an intentional mental state; that is, 
“punishment” is not cruel and unusual unless the prison official 
affirmatively intends that action and it is not the result of mere 
accident or negligence.355  In that context, the Court quoted Judge 
Posner, who explained that: 
348. Id.
349. Id. at 235–37.
350. Id.
351. See supra notes 346–50 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 323–33 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 346–50 and accompanying text.
354. See infra notes 355–62 and accompanying text.
355. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
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The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to 
chastise or deter.  This is what the word means today; it is 
what it meant in the eighteenth century…. [I]f [a] guard 
accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this 
would not be punishment in anything remotely like the 
accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult the 
usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.356 
If punishment means the same thing in the Thirteenth Amendment 
as it does in the Eighth – and there is no good reason to treat them 
differently – slavery as punishment for a crime can only pass 
constitutional muster if it is intentionally imposed by the sentencing 
judge and authorized by Congress.357  This is so because 
“punishment always requires a mental state: It is imposed 
intentionally by a legislature or a sentencing judge . . . .”358  In other 
words, a prisoner could not be held as a slave (i.e., traded as property 
for the benefit of a private entity) unless the judge so ordered because 
“prison conditions, no matter how harsh, can never qualify as 
punishment without inquiring into the mental state of a prison 
official.”359  Further, we recognize that legislatures know how to tie 
such a sentence together for certain crimes given the history of the 
black codes and convict leasing discussed above.360  Therefore, 
because Congress has not authorized slavery for any crime, and no 
judge has imposed that sentence, any prisoner currently incarcerated 
in a private for-profit reason is being held contrary to the Thirteenth 
Amendment.361 
As the Constitution’s ban on slavery through the Thirteenth 
Amendment should eliminate the use of private for-profit prisons in 
the United States, we finally argue that private incarceration should 
be eradicated because it violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.362 
356. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985)).
357. See id.
358. Ghali, supra note 295, at 635.
359. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300; see Ghali, supra note 295, at 635.
360. See supra notes 307–10 and accompanying text.
361. See infra Section IV.F.
362. See infra Section IV.F.
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F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution affirms:
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”363  The Supreme Court 
has reasoned “that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.”364  The Court 
has employed various analytical approaches depending on the context 
of the challenged government behavior, including: “gross 
disproportionality,” a “categorical approach that implements bright 
line rules to prohibit certain sentencing practices,”365 and “wanton 
and unnecessary infliction of pain.”366  Under any of these 
paradigms, treating people like slaves by commodifying their 
existence is cruel and unusual.367 
We first note that modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is at 
best a “thicket” of confusing holdings muddled by plurality 
opinions.368  Additionally, an Eighth Amendment  challenge to 
private for-profit incarceration falls far outside the typical cases 
addressed under the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.369 
Those cases—especially the ones that receive attention from the 
Supreme Court—tend to be capital cases, often deal with methods of 
execution, otherwise seek the boundaries of life imprisonment, 
address the lack of medical care, or confront dangerous 
overcrowding.370 
Further, given other abhorrent practices currently at the forefront of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—for example, torturous 
combinations of chemicals used in lethal injection compounds that 
363. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
364. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
365. Kevin White, The Constitutional Limits of the “National Consensus” Doctrine in
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1371, 1372.
366. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
367. See id.
368. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
369. See generally The Case Against the Death Penalty, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (2012),
https://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/6AX5-
CZVC] (discussing that the normal case challenging the Eighth Amendment is
regarding the death penalty) .
370. See id.; see also Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Closely Divides on “Cruel and
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can lead to prisoners “writhing in pain”—371warehousing prisoners in 
private facilities in the service of enriching corporations and their 
shareholders represents a more abstract concern that can fail to 
resonate as deeply.372  Nonetheless, here we sketch the outlines of an 
Eighth Amendment challenge using broad principles underlying the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.373 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has employed a proportionality 
analysis to challenges involving the sentence of a particular person 
(usually for terms-of-year challenges) and reserved the categorical 
analysis for capital cases.374  Recently, however, the court has 
signaled a willingness to expand the scope of its categorical analysis 
to include non-capital sentences.375  We argue that the unique 
circumstances involved with incarcerating people for profit 
implicates concerns that make a categorical challenge relying on 
modern conceptions of human dignity appropriate.376 This categorical 
approach looks to “evolving standards of decency” including national 
consensus, international considerations, historical teachings, and the 
judge’s own conscience.377 
The existence of a national consensus on a given correctional 
practice, or a lack thereof, is often a major consideration for courts.378  
That determination includes, but is not limited to, looking to state 
legislatures as a barometer of preferences across the nation.379  Here, 
for-profit incarceration is currently used in a majority of states and by 
several federal agencies.380  Consequently, it may seem that there is a 
national consensus supporting for-profit incarceration.381  However, 
there is significant momentum against private prisons, including: 
multiple states passing recent legislation banning the practice; a 
widespread divestment campaign consisting of diverse groups from 
students and teachers to banks; and growing political effort to push 
371. Graham L. Brewer & Manny Fernandez, Oklahoma Botched 2 Executions. It Says It’s
Ready to Try Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
02/13/us/oklahoma-executions.html [https://perma.cc/T3J2-QMH2].
372. See supra notes 368–71 and accompanying text.
373. See infra notes 374–96 and accompanying text.
374. White, supra note 365, at 1372–73.
375. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61–62 (2010).
376. See infra notes 377–96 and accompanying text.
377. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592–600 (1977).
378. White, supra note 365, at 1376–78 (tracing the history of the national consensus
approach and major benchmark cases).
379. Id. at 1367.
380. See GOTSCH & BASTI, supra note 286, at 5.
381. See id.
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the conversation into the mainstream.382  Additionally, we expect this 
momentum to continue, strengthening the argument as potential cases 
work their way through the court system.383 
Courts also inform their Eighth Amendment analysis by 
considering the historical perspective of the challenged practice.384 
As discussed above, for-profit incarceration is just the latest iteration 
of slavery, an institution that is widely regarded among the most 
morally repugnant in the history of the world.385  Through this lens, 
the historical perspective on profiting off ownership of another 
person is clear: at least since the late 19th century in the United 
States, such a relationship is a complete anathema.386  Even if a 
reviewing court does not see the for-profit incarceration arrangement 
as tantamount to slavery, it should nonetheless be convinced that 
carrying out punishment for a crime has essentially always been the 
province of the state.387  In either case, the historical perspective on 
ownership of or profiting off the punishment of another person 
weighs against the constitutionality of the practice.388 
Finally, the third main prong that courts review to determine where 
the current evolving standard of decency stands is through looking at 
international standards.389  In Roper, for example, the Court quoted 
this noteworthy passage from Thompson v. Oklahoma to arrive at its 
holding: 
382. See Catherine Kim, Private Prisons Face an Uncertain Future as States Turn Their
Backs on the Industry, VOX (Dec. 1, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2019/12/1/20989336/private-prisons-states-bans-califonia-nevada-
colorado [https://perma.cc/K8HU-UKRP]; see Molly Korab, University Students Push
for Prison Divestment, COMMON DREAMS (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.commondream
s.org/views/2015/02/02/university-students-push-prison-divestment [https://perma.cc/
8RMR-GNDV]; see Mike Ludwig, In the US, Big Banks Are Divesting from Private
Prisons, Thanks to Anti-ICE Activism, EQUAL TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.eq
ualtimes.org/in-the-us-big-banks-are-divesting?lang=en#.Xi3lXGhKhPY [https://per
ma.cc/EM4Y-LQ5K]; see Ashley Smith, New York Teachers Fight for Divestment
from Prison Industry, TRUTHOUT (June 12, 2019), https://truthout.org/articles/new-
york-teachers-fight-for-divestment-from-prison-industry/ [https://perma.cc/G4RZ-
3GL3].
383. See supra notes 378–82 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Section IV.E.1.
385. See supra Section IV.E.4.
386. See Vicky Peláez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New
Form of Slavery?, CTR. FOR RES. ON GLOBALIZATION (Dec. 15, 2019),
https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-big-business-
or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289 [https://perma.cc/H9BR-9A9E].
387. But see id.
388. See id.
389. See infra notes 390–95 and accompanying text.
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The plurality also observed that “[t]he conclusion that it 
would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a 
person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or 
her offense is consistent with the views that have been 
expressed by respected professional organizations, by other 
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the 
leading members of the Western European community.”390 
Here, the evidence is mixed.391  Israel stands out as the prime 
example of a nation that has banned the practice of for-profit 
incarceration, and they did so in a convincing manner, relying on 
human rights and philosophies shared with the United States.392  
Likewise, only a small number of countries overall use private prison 
facilities: approximately eleven as of 2013.393  However, the trend 
does seem to be growing somewhat, and the practice is concentrated 
in English-speaking common law countries, such as England, 
Australia, and New Zealand.394  Nevertheless, momentum in 
opposition to private incarceration for profit is growing in the United 
States.395 
Thus, on balance, based on national, historical, and international 
perspectives and practices, we argue that private prisons run afoul of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
while recognizing the challenges inherent to this claim.396  And 
further, we hope that as this practice receives additional public 
scrutiny, more states will ban for-profit incarceration within their 
borders, strengthening the Eighth Amendment argument. 
V. CONCLUSION
For a myriad of reasons, the very existence of private for-profit
incarceration represents questionable and dubious legality.397  We 
argue above that on at least six primary grounds private prisons are 
390. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 830 (1988)).
391. See infra notes 392–95 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
393. See Cody Mason, International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization, SENT’G 




395. See supra notes 382–83 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 363–95 and accompanying text.
397. See supra Part II.
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unconstitutional.398  Further, we argue above that private prisons are 
abhorrent on moral grounds, including for the ways that for-profit 
incarceration wrecks access to justice and diminishes equality in the 
U.S. criminal justice system.399  When a carceral regime incentivizes 
incarcerating more U.S. residents for longer periods of time, with 
lesser hope for rehabilitation400 and achieves its ends by offering less 
safe, less efficient, and less humane prison conditions,401 then this 
regime must be confronted. 
Private prisons have not been the panacea promised by 
corporations responsible for selling their use to government 
entities.402  From private local jails to private federal prisons, we see 
rampant prisoner abuse,403 underqualified and underpaid staff,404 lack 
of educational opportunities and rehabilitation programs,405 and cost 
savings that vanish on close analysis.406  Granting such power to 
private entities violates the constitutional rights of prisoners so 
housed.407 
398. See supra Part IV.
399. See supra Part III.
400. See supra notes 72–76, 140 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part II.
403. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 74–76, 82–85 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
406. See supra Section III.B.
407. See supra Part IV.
